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Abstract 
The purpose of this Master of Business Administration Professional Report is 
to deliver a concept enabling joint effects-based contracting (EBC) execution 
throughout all of the following phases of the combatant commander’s (CCDR’s) 
campaign plan: shaping, deterring, seizing the initiative, dominating, and stabilizing 
and enabling (Phases 0-V), respectively.  Under the enabling civil authority phase of 
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF), the Commanding General of the Joint Contracting 
Command-Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A) pioneered effects-based contracting (EBC) to 
align tactical contracting efforts with the strategic objectives of the OIF campaign 
plan.  The JCC-I/A accomplished this by integrating contingency contracting officers 
(CCOs) with the warfighters’ operational planning cycles, linking contracting efforts 
with desired strategic operational effects, and prioritizing contracting work based on 
the warfighters’ main efforts. 
This project applies EBC methodologies and the systems engineering 
process to introduce the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System (JEBCES)—an integrated composite of people, products, and 
processes to deliver an acquisition capability.  Within this framework, the 
researchers propose a Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) to enable 
forward-leaning, responsive joint expeditionary contract support.  This framework 
emphasizes providing future CCOs with a pre-awarded, rapidly deployable 
acquisition capability, thereby creating greater uniformity and efficiency in joint EBC 
execution. 
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Executive Summary 
The Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System (JEBCES) provides 
the framework for an integrated composite of people, products and processes to 
deliver an acquisition capability.  Within this framework, the researchers proposed a 
Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) as the contracting vehicle to absorb 
cumulative variations in warfighter requirements definitions and Contingency 
Contracting Officer (CCO) execution methodologies; thereby creating uniformity and 
efficiency in joint expeditionary contracting execution throughout all phases of the 
Combatant Commander’s (CCDR’s) campaign plan. 
The researchers based PBAC on their experiences with the Department of 
Army’s contracting model for the Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program 
(LOGCAP) and the United States Special Operation Command’s Integrated Weapon 
System Support Program in which standard contracting vehicles support multiple 
phases of contingency operations as well as sustain major weapon system platforms 
through discrete contract line item number (CLIN) structures.  PBAC provides the 
framework for time-definite delivery of standard supplies and services through 
standardized contracting vehicles. 
Through discrete-event simulation and modeling of FY 2007 enabling civil 
authority phase requirements data through the current joint contingency contracting 
process and the proposed PBAC, the researchers conclude the following.  To the 
extent that the DOD standardizes both operational (kinetic) and reconstruction (post-
kinetic) requirements (based on a full phase-based spend analysis), and contracting 
execution methodologies (based on standard rapid acquisition methods), the 
enterprise can optimize the use of CCOs and provide a high percentage of 


























Initial efforts to integrate and synchronize tactical joint expeditionary 
contracting support with the strategic objectives of the OIF campaign plan were 
delayed by variations in CCO experience levels, contracting execution 
methodologies, and business processes.  As a result, in November 2004 (under the 
stabilize phase (Phase IV) of the campaign plan), the United States Central 
Command (USCENTCOM) established the Joint Contracting Command-Iraq (JCC-
I), and later established the JCC-I/A (Afghanistan) to unify the contracting effort.  
Under the enable civil authority phase (Phase V), the JCC-I/A implemented effects-
based contracting (EBC) as an innovative method to successfully integrate CCOs 
into warfighter operational planning cycles in order to align tactical contracting 
support with the warfighters’ main efforts. 
Although a Joint Contracting Command (JCC), using EBC methodologies, 
has significant implications for improved joint expeditionary contracting execution, 
recent reports such as the 2007 Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in Expeditionary Operations (Gansler Report) continue to 
underscore systemic variations in requirements definitions and service-unique 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) for CCO training and development, 
which collectively influences contracting execution.  Against this backdrop, the 
researchers introduce the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System (JEBCES) and within this framework, a researcher-proposed 
Phase-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) as the contracting vehicle to enable 
forward-leaning, responsive joint expeditionary contracting execution.  
Through discrete-event simulation and modeling of FY07 enabling civil 
authority phase data under the current joint contingency contracting process and the 
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cumulative variations in warfighter requirements definitions and CCO execution 
methodologies to create uniformity and efficiency in joint expeditionary contracting 
execution. 
B. Objectives of the Research 
The objective of this research is to analyze the application of a PBAC within 
the JEBCES framework.  Through discrete-event simulation and modeling, the 
researchers will assess the value of equipping CCOs with a pre-awarded, rapidly 
deployable PBAC. 
C. Research Questions 
The primary research question is:  does transforming a baseline of common 
operational (kinetic) and reconstruction (post-kinetic) requirements into a standard 
PBAC improve joint EBC execution?  To aid in addressing the primary research 
question, the researchers will also address four secondary questions:  
1. How can a PBAC provide for a percentage of uniformed warfighter 
requirements definitions? 
2. How can a PBAC provide for efficient use of limited contracting officer 
resources? 
3. What are the benefits of integrating and synchronizing a PBAC into 
Phase 0 (shaping phase) of the Combatant Commander’s campaign 
plan? 
4. How can the JEBCES establish the framework to enable responsive 
joint expeditionary contracting execution? 
D. Methodology 
Research for this project includes a literature review of government reports, 
joint publications, and academic research papers such as, but not limited to, 
previous Naval Postgraduate School contingency contracting theses and 
Congressional Research Reports.  Additionally, the project team used Arena 10.0 
Forward Business Solutions by Rockwell Software, Inc., to provide discrete-event 
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process and the researcher-proposed PBAC—specifically, how the PBAC affects 
CCO utilization rates and the cycle-time of warfighter requirements.  The information 
used to develop models and FY07 requirements data was obtained from the JCC-
I/A’s current contingency contracting database, namely the Joint Contingency 
Contracting System.  Finally, this project incorporates input from the personal 
experiences of the authors as a CCO/Aide-de-Camp to the Commanding General of 
the Joint Contracting Command, JCC-I/A Commanding General’s Staff Operations 
Officer (J3), and as an Administrative Contracting Officer for the Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
E. Assumptions 
The authors assume the reader has a fundamental understanding that the 
President of the United States is responsible for national security.  The National 
Security Council (NSC) assists the President in determining how to effectively 
employ the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of power to 
achieve national goals.  The NSC coordinates the efforts of all governmental 
agencies to execute synchronized strategies that effectively employ the instruments.  
The Department of Defense (DOD) prepares the National Defense Strategy to 
support the National Security Strategy.  The National Military Strategy contains the 
advice of the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff on the role of the Armed Forces 
implementing the National Security and National Defense Strategies.  The 
Chairman, on behalf of the Secretary of Defense, directs combatant commanders 
(CCDRs) to develop theater security cooperation plans as well as war and campaign 
plans (Department of the Army, 2005). 
F. Definitions and Terms 
The following definitions are provided to establish the framework for the 
JEBCES: 
Effects – “an effect is a physical and/or behavioral state of a system that 
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also be thought of as condition that can support achieving an associated 
objective, while an undesired effect is a condition that can inhibit progress 
toward an objective” (US Joint Forces Command, 2006, pp. III-12).  
Effects-based Operations – “are defined here as operations conceived and 
planned in a systems framework that considers the full range of direct, 
indirect and cascading effect—effects that may be achieved by the application 
of military, diplomatic, psychological and economic instruments” (RAND, 
2001).  
Enabling Concept – "is a description of how a particular task or procedure is 
performed, within the context of a broader functional area, using a particular 
capability, such as a specific technology, training education program, 
organization, facility, etc.  An enabling concept describes the accomplishment 
of a particular task that makes possible military function or sub-function” 
(Schmitt, 2002, p.10).  
Acquisition – “acquiring by contract with appropriated funds of supplies or 
services (including construction) by and for the use of the Federal 
Government through purchase or lease, whether the supplies or serves are 
already in existence or must be created, developed, or demonstrated, and 
evaluated.  Acquisition begins at the point when agency needs are 
established and includes the description of requirements to satisfy agency 
needs, solicitation and selection of sources, award of contracts, contracting 
financing, contract performance, contract administration, and those technical 
and management functions directly related to the process of fulfilling agency 
needs by contract” (General Services Administration, 2005, section 2.101). 
Contract Types – “Contract types are grouped into two broad categories:  
fixed price and cost reimbursement contracts, in which the contractor has full 
responsibility for the performance costs and resulting profit (or loss), to cost-
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performance cost and the negotiated fee (profit) is fixed.  In between there 
are various incentive contracts in which the contractor’s responsibility for the 
performance costs and the profit or fee incentives offered are tailored to the 
uncertainties involved in contract performance” (GSA, 2005, section 16.1(b)). 
Delivery Order Contracts – “Contract for a supply that does not procure or 
specify a firm quantity of supplies (other than a minimum and maximum 
quantity) and that provides for issuance of orders for the delivery of supplies 
during the period of the contract” (GSA, 2005, section 16.501). 
Task Order Contracts – “Contract for services that does not procure or specify 
a firm quantity of service (other than a minimum and a maximum quantity) 
and that provides for the issuance of orders for the performance of tasks 
during the period of the contract” (GSA, 2005, section 16.501). 
Terminology – Throughout the project, the terms “expeditionary” and 
“contingency” are used interchangeably. 
Theory of Constraints (TOC) – The TOC proposes that “in any multi-stage 
processing system, one stage will be slower than the others. 
The theory of constraints has 5 steps:  
1. Identify the system constraints (no improvement is possible unless the 
constraint or weakest link is found) 
2. Decide how to exploit the system constraints (Make the constraints as 
effective as possible) 
3. Subordinate everything else to that decision (align every other part of 
the system to support the constraints even if this reduces the efficiency 
of non-constraint resources) 
4. Evaluate the system constraints (if output is still inadequate, acquire 
more of this resource so it no longer is a constraint) 
5. If in the previous steps, the constraints have been broken, go back to 
step 1, but do not let inertia become the system constraint. (After this 
constraint problem is solved, go back to the beginning and start over.  
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breaking them, and then identifying the new ones that result)” (Apte et 
al., 2006, p. 103). 
Little’s Law: – Little’s Law states “the following fundamental relation always 
holds true among the average flow rate (throughput), R, the average cycle-
time, T, and the average inventory, I:  I = R x T” (Apte et al., 2006, p. 20). 
G. Organization of Research 
The following chapters capture the initial study on the JEBCES.  Chapter I 
introduces the research project and provides background, objectives of the research, 
research questions, methodology and assumptions, key definitions and terms.  
Chapter II presents the warfighters’ operational framework and examines the 
effectiveness of EBC methodologies under the current enable civil authority phase 
(Phase V).  Chapter III reviews the evolution of the joint expeditionary contracting 
experience in Iraq from the deter phase (Phase I) through the stabilize phase (Phase 
IV) and highlights systemic variations in areas such as requirements definitions and 
service-specific TTPs for joint expeditionary contracting execution.  Chapter IV 
introduces the framework for the JEBCES and presents a researcher-proposed 
PBAC as an enabling concept.  Chapter V presents discrete-event simulation and 
modeling of the current joint expeditionary contracting execution process and the 
researcher-proposed PBAC.  Chapter VI provides the simulation results and 
analysis, as well as implications for future joint EBC execution.  Chapter VII presents 
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II. Overview of Operation Iraqi Freedom 
Campaign Plan, Lines of Operations, and Effects-
Based Contracting 
A. Introduction 
Before analyzing EBC methodologies, it is essential to establish a basic 
understanding of the warfighters’ operational framework for OIF.  The first section of 
this chapter provides background on the campaign plan phases and related 
activities.  The second section describes the lines of operations (LOOs) within the 
campaign plan and highlights the importance of their synchronization.  The third 
section introduces the JCC-I/A and analyzes the command’s EBC methodologies 
during Operation Together Forward I (OTFI), construction of the Rusafa Law and 
Order Facility, and Iraqi Date Palm Spraying Operations, as these represent the 
broad range of environments in which EBC must facilitate conditions to achieve 
desired outcomes.  Moreover, they illustrate the importance of synchronized, time-
definite delivery of supplies and services to support the CCDR’s strategic objectives.  
The authors thought it prudent to begin this discussion where joint EBC execution 
and the CCDR’s strategic objectives converge—the  campaign plan—followed by a 
discussion of the broader, national strategic framework that the campaign plan 
supports. 
B.  OIF Campaign Plan Phases 
A campaign plan embodies the theater combatant commander’s strategic 
vision for the arrangement of operations needed to attain the strategic 
objectives assigned by a higher authority.  It achieves unity of effort with 
unified action (joint, combined or coalition, and interagency); clearly defines 
what constitutes success; and serves as the basis for subordinate planning.  
A campaign plan is the operational extension of the combatant commander’s 
theater strategy.  They translate strategic concepts into unified plans for 
military action by specifying how operations, logistics, and time will be used to 
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Central to planning for major operations such as OIF is campaign plan 
phasing.  Phasing (e.g., shaping, deterring, seizing the initiative, dominating, and 
enabling civil authority) assists commanders and staff in visualizing the entire 
campaign and defining requirements in terms of forces, resources, time, space and 
purpose to achieve strategic objectives (US Joint Forces Command, 2006). 
 
Figure 1.   Campaign Plan Phases Versus Level of Military Effort  
(Johnson, 2008) 
Figure 1 presents the unclassified version of OIF phasing in relation to military 
effort. Commanders and staffs used phasing to assist in determining the level of 
military effort to support the dominate phase in May of 2003 and the additional 
resources required to shift to the stabilize phase.  Although the phase-specific 
activities of the OIF campaign plan are classified, Joint Publication (JP) 5-0, Joint 
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overview of each phase and the related activities. The authors begin with Phase I 
and will highlight the significance of Phase 0 (shaping) in chapter IV. 
1. Phase I: Deter Phase (December 2002) 
By the US Joint Forces Doctrine, the intent of the deter phase was to deter 
objectionable enemy action by demonstrating the capabilities and resolve of the joint 
force, and was characterized by preparatory actions such as mobilization and initial 
deployment of military personnel into theater (US Joint Forces Command, 2006).  
“On December 18, 2002, Pentagon officials released preliminary approval to send 
50,000 additional troops to the Persian Gulf region” (Sanger & Preston, 2002).  As a 
result, deter phase-related activities centered on the buildup of military hardware and 
the logistical sequencing of military personnel into theater. 
2. Phase II: Seize the Initiative Phase (January 2003)   
With the initial buildup of weaponry and more than 250,000 military personnel 
in the region, commanders were poised to seize the initiative by applying the 
appropriate amount of joint force capabilities (US Joint Forces Command, 2006).  
Particular examples of joint force capabilities include the following:  intelligence, 
surveillance and reconnaissance assets, tanks, aircraft carriers and strategic airlift 
such as the US Air Force’s C-17 Globemaster III. 
3. Phase III: Dominate Phase (March 2003)  
This phase included full employment joint force capabilities and continued the 
appropriate sequencing of forces into the operational area (US Joint Forces 
Command, 2006).  The dominate phase was characterized by dominating and 
controlling the operational environment through a combination of conventional, 
unconventional, information and stability operations (US Joint Forces Command, 
2006).  An example of dominating and controlling the operational environment 
culminated on March 19, 2003, when US and coalition forces launched “shock and 
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4. Phase IV: Stabilize Phase (April 2003 – December 2005) 
Saddam Hussein’s removal from power marked the end of the dominate 
phase and the beginning of the stabilize phase.  Without a fully functional, legitimate 
civil governing authority present, the joint force was required to perform limited local 
governance (US Joint Forces Command, 2006).  On April 16, 2003, the 
Commanding General of United States Army Central Command, General Tommy 
Franks, issued an order establishing the Coalitional Provisional Authority to 
temporarily exercise powers of government for Iraq (Special Inspector General for 
Iraq Reconstruction, 2006).  This required the joint force to integrate the efforts of 
other supporting/contributing multinational, intergovernmental, and non-
governmental organizations to assist in the provision of basic services and security 
to the population (US Joint Forces Command, 2006). 
5. Phase V: Enable Civil Authority Phase (Jan 2006 – Present) 
The late December 2005 democratic election of Iraq’s 275-member National 
Assembly marked the beginning of a functional government and the start of the 
enabling civil authority phase.  This phase was predominantly (and still is) 
characterized by the joint force supporting the legitimate civil governance in theater 
(US Joint Forces Command, 2006).  The enabling civil authority phase activities 
include support for political, economic, and security capacity building and rebuilding 
of the country’s infrastructure.  An example of joint force support to capacity building 
culminated in the summer of 2006 when joint and coalition forces provided support 
to Operation Together Forward I—one of the first operations led by Iraqi security 
forces to restore security in some of Baghdad’s most violent neighborhoods. 
C. Lines of Operation 
As commanders envisioned the operational design for OIF, they used several 
lines of operations (LOOs) to visualize the intended progress of the joint force 
towards achieving operational and strategic objectives (US Joint Forces Command, 
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LOOs define the orientation of the force in time, space and purpose in relation 
to an adversary or objective. Normally, joint operations require commanders 
to synchronize activities along multiple and complementary LOOs working 
through a series of strategic and operational objectives to attain the military 
end state. (US Joint Forces Command, 2006, pp. IV-19)  
Figure 2 presents four sample logical LOOs:  diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic; all of which must be synchronized throughout all phases of 
the campaign plan to achieve the broader national strategic objectives.  For 
example, in the figure below, the red-dotted arrows illustrate the importance of 
synchronizing the LOOs to achieve the National Strategic Objectives. 
 
Figure 2.   Sample Logical Lines of Operations  
(US Joint Forces Command, 2006, pp. IV-22) 
According to the former Commanding General of the Multinational Corps-Iraq 
(MNC-I), Major General Peter W. Chiarelli, “operations [for OIF] maintained 
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conceptual LOOs. […].  Each moving incrementally and cumulatively toward 
decisively accomplishing the goal of shifting Baghdad away from instability [to 
stability]” (Chiarelli & Michaelis, 2005, p. 1).  
The first LOO is the military line of operation (MLO), in which the MNC-I 
provides command and control (C2) of kinetic operations throughout Iraq (MNC-I 
Mission Statement, 2006).  The second LOO is the transitional line of operation 
(TLO). Along this LOO, the Multinational Security Transition Corps-Iraq (MNSTC-I 
commonly called "min-sticky") is responsible for organizing, training, equipping, and 
mentoring ISF throughout the country of Iraq (MNSTC-I Mission Statement, 2006).  
The third LOO is the reconstruction line of operation (RLO), where the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers Gulf Region Division (USACE GRD) provides quality and 
sustainable, responsive, full spectrum engineering services to support civil and 
military construction in Iraq (GRD Mission Statement, 2006).  The fourth LOO is the 
economic line of operation (ELO), wherein the JCC-I/A is charged with providing 
contract support to the warfighter as well as facilitating economic growth in the Iraqi 
economy.  The fifth is the governance line of operation (GLO), in which the 
Department of Justice and Department of State share responsibility to assist in local 
and national governance. The LOOs are linked into the three integrated strategic 
tracks of the 2005 National Security Strategy for Victory in Iraq (NSSVI)—political, 
security, and economic.   
The first of these integrated tracks is the political track.  The strategic 
objective of this track is to help the Iraqi people forge a broadly supported national, 
compact democratic government by isolating enemy elements from those who 
desire to participate in the democratic process, engaging those outside the political 
process, and building stable infrastructure and institutions to protect the citizens of 
Iraq (National Security Council, 2005).  The second is the security track, in which the 
intent is to secure the country while carrying out a campaign to defeat the terrorists 
and neutralize them by clearing areas of enemy control, holding areas freed from 
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to deliver [essential] services” (National Security Council, 2005, p. 8).  The third of 
these integrated tracks is the economic track.  “The objective of the economic track 
is to assist the Iraq government in establishing the foundations for a sound economy 
with the capacity to deliver essential services by restoring Iraq’s infrastructure, 
reforming Iraq’s economy, and building the capacity of Iraq’s institutions” (National 
Security Council, 2005, p. 9). 
D. Joint Contracting Command Iraq/Afghanistan  
In order to better support the national strategic objectives of the NSSVI and 
the ELO within the campaign plan, USCENTCOM issued Fragmentary Order 
(FRAGO) 09-1117 in November 2006.  The FRAGO directed the commanders 
(including MNFI and Combined Task Force (CTJF-76) to update contracting 
organizational relationships and unify the contacting effort. Additionally, FRAGO 
established the following three objectives for the JCC-I/A:  “1) Integrate warfighter 
campaign plans and strategy and achieve effects, 2) Achieve unity of effort and 
economies of scale that exemplify best business practices, and 3) Create synergy 
with economic activities in local private and public sectors, serving as a catalyst for 
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Figure 3.   The JCC-I/A Theater Contracting Support Structure  
(Joint Contracting Command-Iraq/Afghanistan, 2006) 
1. Organizational Structure  
Figure 3 presents the 2006 organizational and theater contracting support for 
the JCC-I/A.  The command is a Major Subordinate Command (MSC) under the 
MNF-I and provides responsive operational contracting support to the Chiefs of 
Mission, MNF-I, and CTJF-76 – Afghanistan.  The JCC-I/A provides operational 
(kinetic) contracting support to warfighters through regional contracting centers 
(RCCs) and reconstruction (post-kinetic) contracting support through reconstruction 
offices (RCOs).  
2. Contingency Contracting Officer Resources  
In 2006, the JCC-I/A had approximately 165 contingency contracting officer 
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varying degrees of experience.  The experience levels ranged from Defense 
Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (DAWIA) Acquisition Professional 
Development Program (APDP) Level I CCOs to APDP Level III CCOs. The DAWIA 
was signed into law in November 1990 and required the DOD to establish education 
and training standards (e.g., Levels I, II, and III) for the acquisition workforce.   
Although APDP Levels are under the DAWIA, each service has unique TTPs 
for employing CCOs.  For example, the US Air Force typically trains and develops 
CCOs when airmen and 2nd lieutenants first enter the contracting career field.  After 
two years of training, CCOs are then eligible to deploy in support of contingency 
operations for a period of 120 to 179 days.  Conversely, the Army trains and 
develops CCOs at the senior captain and major levels, and usually deploys CCOs 
for 12 to 15 months, most of whom have limited contingency contracting experience.  
Moreover, Navy and Marine CCOs experience similar variations in training and 
dwell-times.  Service-unique TTPs and variations in dwell-times can produce 
inefficient joint expeditionary execution.  The impact of inefficient joint expeditionary 
contracting execution will be further examined under previous campaign plan phases 
in Chapter III.  
E. Effects-based Contracting (EBC) 
In June of 2006, the Commanding General of the JCC-I/A pioneered EBC to 
align tactical contracting efforts in order to support the ELO within the campaign 
plan.  “EBC is getting synergistic effects through the coordination of contracting 
resources and capabilities in time, space and purpose, in order to support the 
warfighter” (Delong & Gilbeau, 2007, p. 61).  The key tenant of EBC is to insert the 
CCO early in the planning process, at appropriate locations within the unit’s battle 
rhythm, and from the corps to the battalion level (Delong & Gilbeau, 2007).  The 
JCC-I/A established five key components of the EBC methodology: 
1.  Developing a concept of support 
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3. Knowing the warfighters’ battle rhythm 
4. Ensuring visibility by being in the right planning evolution 
5. Having flexibility within the enterprise (Delong & Gilbeau, 2007, p.61) 
Although not exhaustive, the following are examples of how the JCC-I/A used 
the five components of EBC to support the CCDR’s broad range of strategic 
objectives: 
1. EBC: Operation Together Forward 
On June 14, 2006, Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki announced the launch of 
Operation Together Forward I (OTFI).  OTFI was one of the first operations in which 
Iraqi security forces were in the lead and joint and coalition partners were in support.  
One critical component of OTFI was the Baghdad Security Plan (BSP).  Under BSP 
the desired effect for the government of Iraq (GOI) was to increase security and 
provide essential services to the citizens of Baghdad.  
The first step in the EBC methodology for the JCC-I/A was to develop a 
concept of support.  With ISF clearing neighborhoods and buildings along the TLO, 
post-kinetic reconstruction efforts had to be synchronized to deliver essential 
services to the residents of Baghdad.  These efforts required CCOs to proactively 
integrate into the warfighters’ operational planning evolutions; specifically; in 
sequencing and phasing. “Part of the art of planning is determining the sequence of 
activities that accomplish the mission most efficiently” (Department of the Army, 
2005, pp. I-16).  Figure 4 captures the sequencing of kinetic operations to clear the 
neighborhoods of Baghdad and categorizes them in terms of completed, started, 
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Figure 4.   Multi-national Force Iraq Slide Operation Together Forward  
(Roggio, 2006) 
Central to the success of the BSP was the speed at which post-kinetic 
reconstruction operations followed kinetic operations.  For example, when ISF 
completed the Mansour neighborhoods of E. Mansour, Ameriyah, and Khadra 
(numbers 3, 5, and 7 in Figure 4), post-kinetic operations such as the delivery of 
essential services had to immediately follow in order to relieve the suffering of 
noncombatants. Figure 5 captures the Mansour neighborhood’s project status and 
categorizes them in terms of complete, ongoing, and planned in the following areas:  
buildings, health & education; electricity; public works & water; and security & 
justice.  Of particular note is the effect post-kinetic projects had on host nation (HN) 
per-day employment numbers in Figure 4 (24,648).  HN employment numbers 
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Figure 5.   Baghdad Reconstruction Projects by Status  
(Roggio, 2006) 
As a part of alignment and synchronization of tactical contracting efforts to 
support the ELO, the JCC-I/A had to identify key players along their respective 
LOOs.  From the operational level, MNC-I was responsible for the MLO, MNSTC-I 
was responsible for the TLO and the United States Mission-Iraq and elements of the 
Department of Justice were responsible for the GLO.  Key tactical players were the 
ground commanders, local provincial leaders, and the Provincial Reconstruction 
Teams.  Established by Secretary Rice on November 11, 2005, “the core PRT 
mission is helping the provincial governments with:  developing a transparent and 
sustained capability to deliver essential services, promoting increased security and 
rule of law, promoting political and economic development” (Department of State, 
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Knowing the battle rhythm of warfighters is the third component of EBC.  
“Joint Battle Rhythm is the timing and scheduled presentation of situation reports, 
briefings, formal collaborative sessions and other required actions during planning 
and execution” (Duffy, Bordetsky, Blazevich, & Oros, 2004, p.1).  At the tactical and 
operational levels, CCOs from the Principle Assistant Responsible for Contracting-
Forces (PARC-F) and other RCCs attended daily and weekly operational briefs in 
order to synchronize expeditionary contracting support with the warfighters’ main 
effort.  
The fourth component of EBC is ensuring visibility by being in the right 
planning evolution.  At the strategic level, the Commanding General of the JCC-I/A, 
Major General Darryl Scott, attended MNF-I Commanding General’s Battle Update 
Assessment (BUA).  The BUA provided strategic situational awareness relative to 
the strategic objectives of the campaign plan and insight that would require the JCC-
I/A’s involvement in major operational planning evolutions.  This information was 
then shared with RCCs and PARC-F through the JCC-I/A’s internal business 
processes as they participated in parallel and collaborative planning sessions with 
the warfighters.  Integrating expeditionary contracting at the strategic, operational, 
and tactical levels was innovative at this time in the sense that it put joint 
expeditionary contracting in a well-poised, proactive position to deliver effects, rather 
than a reactive one under previous campaign plan phases, which produced 
numerous undesired effects.  
The fifth component of EBC is having flexibility within the enterprise. Existing 
contract vehicles throughout the JCC-I/A were critical elements in the time-definite 
delivery of essential services to the neighborhoods of Baghdad.  For example, after 
the kinetic operations to clear neighborhoods started, the JCC-I/A, through existing 
theater-wide contracts, delivered essential services such as water and electricity one 
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2. EBC: Construction of the Rusafa Law and Order Facility 
Another example of EBC execution was the construction of the Rusafa Law 
and Order Facility.  
On February 28, General David H. Petreus, commanding general of MNF-I 
issued an order requiring the establishment of a law and order complex in the 
heart of Baghdad.  The purpose of the complex was to help the Government 
of Iraq (GOI) improve the judiciary in Baghdad and foster an environment of 
reconciliation throughout Iraq.  The GOI’s visible exercise of the judicial 
system would be a key instrument in gaining the trust and confidence.  As a 
condition, judges, witnesses, and other parties involved with the investigative 
hearings must be protected from anti-GOI attacks and threats.  The desired 
result was the Central Criminal Court of Iraq’s ability to hold public 
investigations and trials in a relatively safe environment.  Gaining the capacity 
to fairly prosecute and house criminals is a key component to the Baghdad 
Security Plan (Operation Fardh Al-Qanoon). (Delong & Gilbeau, 2007, p. 62) 
By using the five components of EBC,  
The team constructed the [$22 million dollar] facility faster [26 days] and 
better than the chief judge had hoped to imagine.  As a result, the chief judge 
decided this complex would not be merely a criminal investigative court, but 
instead, officially designated the facility as the Central Criminal Court of Iraq.  
On April 7, 2007, the first arraignment took place as planned and a man held 
for torture, was remanded for trial. (Delong & Gilbeau, 2007, p. 63) 
3. EBC: Date Palm Spraying Operations 
The last example of EBC execution was spraying operations for Iraq’s 
commercial date palm crop. 
The date palm (Phoenix dactylifera) has provided a source of food and shelter 
throughout history and is linked culturally and spiritually with Iraq. Iraq 
dominated the world date market with 75 percent of the exported dates until 
the late 1970s.  This dominance was lost to other competitors as Iraq became 
involved in wars and trade embargoes were imposed.  Dates still remained 
the second largest industry in Iraq but production was threatened by a large 
number of pests ranging from arthropods, fungi, nematodes, and 
phytoplasma.  The Dubas bug (Ommatissus lybicus) is considered the 
number one arthropod pest of date palms in Iraq.  The Iraqi Ministry of 
Agriculture (MOA) had controlled Dubas bugs through the aerial application of 
ULV pesticides prior to Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003.  Due to the loss of 
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in 2004 and 2005.  Infestation levels rose causing a significant decrease in 
date production.  It was recognized that it was critical to implement control 
measures for the Dubas bug to improve the date production.  In late 2005, the 
MOA in conjunction with Multi-National Forces - Iraq (MNF-I) began planning 
to conduct aerial spraying to control the Dubas bug in date palms in Iraq.  
This agricultural project was a joint effort lead by the Ministry of Agriculture 
[…].  The result was over 77,000 hectares of date palms were aerially 
sprayed to control Dubas bugs in Iraq. (Blow, 2006) 
The JCC-I/A proactively integrated the warfighters’ operational planning 
cycles and established the contracts to facilitate date palm spraying operations.  As 
a result, spraying operations began less than fourteen days after the JCC-I/A 
received the requirement.  This was significant in that the requirement did not follow 
the standard serial contracting process in which the warfighter first defines the 
requirement, receives funding, and then takes the requirement to contracting, but 
rather as a result of proactive integration the JCC-I/A was involved during the 
requirements definition phase.  The timeliness and equal distribution of the date 
palm spraying operations to all date palm farmers directly supported the legitimacy 
of the democratically elected GOI and the strategic objectives of the NSSVI.  
F. Joint Reconstruction Operations Center  
From the strategic, operational, and tactical perspectives, senior U.S. and 
GOI actors used the Joint Reconstruction Operations Center (JROC) for post-kinetic 
operations transparency.  The JCC-I/A integrated the JROC to achieve a common-
operating-picture (COP). The COP provided the forum for senior leaders (within 
each LOO) to assess how their actions affected the others’ actions within the battle 
space, and to a greater extent, how synchronized, individual actions helped to 
achieve the CCDR’s strategic objectives.  
G. Impact on OIF Strategic Objectives 
At the end of FY2006, The JCC-I/A obligated $5.7 billion dollars through 
26,994 contracting actions.  As shown in Figure 6, of the $5.7 billion, $2.2 billion was 
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Figure 6.   The JCC-I/A FY06 End of Year Economic Stimulus Roll-Up  
(JCC-I/A, 2006) 
Moreover, the JCC-I/A reported a significant increase in the number of HN 
prime contractors and subcontractors during this period, which directly supports the 
ELO within the campaign plan and the broader, national strategic objectives of the 
NSSVI economic track to establish the foundations for a sound economy.  
H. Summary 
This chapter discussed the warfighters’ operational framework along with the 
impact of EBC on the CCDR’s strategic objectives under the enable civil authority 
phase of the OIF.  EBC methodologies were analyzed through OTFI, the 
construction of the Rusafa Law and Order Facility, and date palm spraying.   Finally, 
a FY2006 roll-up of the contracting activity and economic stimulus to the Iraqi 
economy was presented. 
Although CCOs with varying degrees of experience under a Joint Contracting 
Command using EBC methodologies have proved successful, the DOD and CCDRs 
did not realize the benefits until almost four years after the OIF campaign plan 
activation in November 2002.  These realities leave the authors with two questions:  
1) what if CCOs were involved in the operational planning cycles/campaign planning 
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effects (namely, time-definite delivery of supplies and services under previous 
phases) prior to the establishment of the JCC-I/A? 
In an effort to begin to answer these two questions, the next chapter presents 
the researchers’ observations of joint expeditionary contracting execution under 
previous campaign plan phases through a review of the 2006 Special Inspector 
General Report: Lessons Learned in Procurement and Contracting and the 2007 
Report of the Commission on Army Acquisition and Program Management in 
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III. Identification and Analysis of Problems 
A. Introduction  
The previous chapter presented the warfighters’ operational framework and 
how, through innovative EBC methodologies, the JCCI-A managed to synchronize 
tactical contracting efforts to support strategic objectives under the enabling civil 
authority phase.  This chapter presents the researchers’ observations of joint 
expeditionary contracting execution under previous campaign plan phases through a 
review of the 2006 Special Inspector General Report: Lessons Learned in 
Procurement and Contracting and the 2007 Gansler Commission Report: Urgent 
Reform Required: Army Expeditionary Contracting.  Specifically, this chapter will 
further detail the variations in business processes, service-unique TTPs for 
employing CCOs, and kinetic and post-kinetic requirements definitions; this will 
thereby expose the fertile ground of opportunities for both warfighters and CCOs to 
deliver effects, namely time-definite supplies and services throughout all phases of 
future operation/campaign plans.  Following this chapter, the researchers will 
introduce the framework of the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution System 
(JEBCES) and the researcher-proposed Phased–based Acquisition Capability 
(PBAC) as an enabling concept for warfighters and CCOs to accomplish this. 
B. OIF Phase—Procurement-funding Timeline Analysis 
1. 2006 SIGIR Lessons Learned Report with Researchers’ Observations 
The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) is the 
successor to the Coalition Provisional Authority Office of Inspector General (CPA-
IG).  The organization was created in October 2004 by a congressional amendment; 
the amendment provided authority for SIGIR to continue the oversight that CPA-IG 
had established for Iraq reconstruction programs and operations.  Specifically, 
SIGIR is mandated with oversight responsibility of the use, and potential misuse, of 
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and revenues associated with reconstruction and rehabilitation activities in Iraq.  
Stuart W. Bowen, Jr., who had served as the CPA-IG since January 20, 2004, 
continues as the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction.  SIGIR reports 
administratively to the Secretaries of State and Defense.  In addition, SIGIR provides 
quarterly and semi-annual reports directly to the US Congress (SIGIR, 2006).  
Figure 7 illustrates the evolution of the contracting experience in Iraq and 
highlights the misalignment of major procurement authorities and funding streams 
with campaign plan phases.  For example, during the shift of joint forces from the 
dominate phase to the stabilize phase of OIF, Congress established the Iraq Relief 
and Reconstruction Fund to support the rebuilding effort.  However, the major 
contracting authority, namely the Organization for Reconstruction and Humanitarian 
Assistance (ORHA),  
suffered from a lack of qualified contracting personnel in theater as it 
prepared to provide post-war relief and reconstruction services in Iraq.  To 
remedy this shortfall, the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) 
transferred three military contracting officers to support ORHA […] however, 
the Principal Assistant Responsible for Contracting [for] USCENTCOM, 
refused to warrant these DCMA contracting officers. (SIGIR, p. 21)   
Variations in business processes such as warranting CCOs to provide 
contract support during the critical transition from the dominate phase to the stabilize 
phase provided for numerous undesired effects not only in the stabilize phase but 
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Deter Seize Dominate Stabilize
OIF Campaign Phasing 
Enable
 
Figure 7.   Major Contracting Authorities–OIF Campaign  
Phasing-Funding Stream  
(Adapted From:  SIGIR, 2006, p. 12) 
a. Phase I: Deter/Closed - Planning/November 2002  
As previously discussed in Chapter I, deter phase-related activities centered 
on requirements for “initial deployments into theater, force protection and logistics 
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2006, pp. IV-37).  Unfortunately, during this same period, “[contracting] agencies 
were individually directed to initiate planning for relief and reconstruction activities in 
Iraq [and with] limited coordination of contracting and procurement among these 
organizations” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 14).  SIGIR goes on to explain, “The lack of 
coordination was attributable, in part, to the fact that most of the activities were 
classified” (SIGIR, 2006, p.14). 
The authors contend that other “part” of the lack of coordination is based 
upon the capabilities-based framework from which the warfighter plans contingency 
operations.  
The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) provides strategic guidance, 
including apportionment of resources (for planning purposes) to the [CCDR] 
and the Chiefs of the Services, to accomplish assigned strategic planning 
tasks, based on current military capabilities, for the next 18 to 24 months.  
The JSCP provides a coherent framework for capabilities-based operations 
planning. (Defense Acquisition University, 2005) 
For example, the 1st Calvary Division, from the operational planner’s 
perspective, brings inherent capabilities such as tanks, aviation, infantry, and the like 
into operational planning cycles.  In particular, the 1st Cavalry Division bring these 
capabilities as they relate to the logistics of phasing in the Cavalry Division into the 
COCOM’s area of operation and the ability for the capability to deliver time-definite 
effects such as the need for F15s to destroy enemy communication towers seven 
hours before the start of the ground assault by M1 Abrams.  Of particular note with 
such capabilities is that the warfighter organizes, trains, and equips around them 
and is therefore able to develop standard TTPs for them.  Unfortunately for 
contingency contracting, no such standard capability exists.  If joint expeditionary 
contracting support was reframed and developed into a capability with the same 
precision for time-definite delivery of bombs on target to take out enemy 
communications towers, CCOs could have had a seat at the deter phase planning 
table. 
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Given the seize the initiative phase-related activities of building up military 
hardware and sequencing joint force capabilities into the AOR to prepare for the 
dominate phase, CCOs and warfighters alike could have benefited from a 
contracting capability while planning for the dominate phase. For example, logistics 
and time-definite delivery of supplies and services could have been part of the 
capabilities package to deal with the requirements of the post-dominate phase 
(stabilize phase).  However, according to SIGIR:  
Between January and March 2003, the U.S. relaxed confidentiality restrictions 
on pre-war relief and reconstruction planning.  More agencies then became 
more openly involved in planning for post-war Iraq.  Financial and acquisition 
[contingency contracting] personnel, however, were largely still not included in 
the interagency planning process. (SIGIR, 2006, p. 19) 
SIGIR further explains “Their [financial and acquisition personnel] absence 
contributed to the limited interagency cooperation on, and centralized support for 
contracting during this period, which had deleterious effects upon subsequent 
phases of the [reconstruction] program” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 19). 
c. Phase III: Dominate/ORHA/March 2003 
Shortly after “shock and awe” and Saddam Hussein’s removal from power, 
contracting efforts focused on the awarding and allocating of funds appropriated by 
Congress to support the rebuilding of Iraq.  However, [during the short time period to 
begin reconstruction operations to deliver essential services] SIGIR explains that, 
unfortunately, “the [reconstruction] effort engaged multiple US government agencies 
possessing overlapping jurisdictions and diverse capacities.  These agencies 
applied a variety of approaches to similar contracting requirements resulting in 
methodologies and outcomes that occasionally came into conflict” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 
10).  Variations in contracting approaches [TTPs] to similar contracting requirements 
prevented efficient contracting execution. 
d. Phase IV: Stabilize/Later CPA/April 2003-December 2005 
During the period-critical shift from the dominate phase to the stabilize phase, 
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directly limited contracting execution   For example, during the shift from 
humanitarian relief to large-scale reconstruction (post-kinetic) operations, contracting 
efforts focused on the awarding and allocating of the $18.4 billion appropriated by 
Congress, namely the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 2 (IRRF 2).  Although 
Congress appropriated IRRF 2 funds in November of 2003, the money did not 
become available to the executing agencies until the Office of Management and 
Budget apportioned it.  OMB released the funds in January 2004 [two months after 
the appropriation], which caused delays in facilitating the conditions to stabilize the 
AOR (SIGIR, 2006).  
2. 2007 Gansler Commission Report with Researchers’ Observations 
Another revealing report on contingency (or expeditionary) contracting is the 
2007 Gansler Commission Report.  The Secretary of the Army established an 
independent Commission headed by Dr. Jacques Gansler, former Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition  Technology & Logistics), to assess Army Acquisition and 
Program Management in expeditionary operations (Commission on Army Acquisition 
and Program Management in Expeditionary Operations, 2007).  The reports focused 
on four major areas affecting expeditionary contracting operations:  education and 
training, tools, policy, and organization.  
a. Education and Training 
The Gansler Commission Report outlined several deficiencies in the 
education and training of contracting personnel such as “the Army does not 
recognize the importance of contracting nor has it enabled responsive acquisitions 
and sustainment of expeditionary operation.  Moreover, the report suggests this, in 
part, has contributed to the fraud, waste and abuse occurring in-theater by Army 
personnel” (See Figure 8) (Commission, 2007, p. 29). The Gansler Commission 
Report also found that the “expeditionary environment requires more trained and 
experienced military officers and non-commissioned officers.  Only 56 percent of the 
military officers and 53 percent of the civilians in the contracting career field are 




do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 31 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 8.   Major Procurement Fraud  
(Commission, 2007, p. 94) 
The lack of sufficient education and training is leading to inefficient 
contracting and a waste of taxpayers’ dollars in contingency environments; where 
there is no time to get every action approved before it is awarded.  The Defense 
Acquisition University (DAU) needs to focus on training the civilian and military 
acquisition, logistics, and contracting workforce as needed for expeditionary 
operations (Commission, 2007).  The DAU should train like the military fights, i.e., 
“JFCOM and Army training exercises must stress rapid acquisition, logistics, and 
contracting in expeditionary operations” (Commission, 2007, p. 54). 
b. Tools 
Tools and training need to be provided to overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary operations (Commission, 2007).  The tools should be provided for 
“overall contracting activities in expeditionary operations so we do not repeat 
mistakes of Operations Iraqi Freedom/Operation Enduring Freedom” (Commission, 
2007, p. 103).  An internal, automated contract documentation system needs to be 
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system, a series of ad-hoc systems were developed, and these systems proved 
inconsistent (SIGIR, 2006).  Therefore, a deployable contracting and procurement 
system should be developed before deploying and should be tested to ensure it can 
be used effectively in contingency environments (SIGIR, 2006). 
The DOD needs to develop an acquisition information system that will enable 
geographic CCDRs to integrate and coordinate the essential acquisition 
information from all contracting organizations throughout its respective AOR.  
Through the integration of this information within an AOR, COCOMs can 
conduct spend analyses to better understand what is actually procured in 
their respective geographical areas. (D’Angelo, Houglan, & Ruckwardt, 2007, 
p. 89) 
There needs to be a system put in place to capture the contracting lessons 
learned from both OIF and OEF.  The lessons learned should be incorporated into 
military leadership schools and the Center for Army Lessons Learned, as well as 
other branch equivalents (Commission, 2007).  In order for the military to learn from 
past mistakes, they need to know what those mistakes are, and use them in current 
training before they deploy to the battlefield.  By failing to capture lessons learned 
the military is destined to continue making the same mistakes over and over again. 
c. Policy 
A key element for future success as outlined in the Gansler Commission 
Report is to obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
effectiveness in expeditionary operations (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007).  
The lack of a common policy or regulation for contingency operations presents many 
problems.  “Throughout the Iraq experience there has been debate about whether 
the FAR provides appropriate flexibilities for the fast-paced contracting required in 
conflict/post-conflict environments like Iraq” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 102).  An Expeditionary 
FAR (EFAR) is needed to define allowable, expedient actions that will be used in 
training and provided to the field (Commission, 2007).  A standard policy would allow 
all agencies to execute contracting with a common rulebook.  Currently, each 
agency in the country is performing contracting functions in accordance with its own 
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administering the contracts from different agencies, and thus the contractors have to 
learn a new contracting system each time they get a contract with a different agency. 
“A single set of simple contracting regulations and procedures that provide 
uniform direction to all contracting personnel in contingency environments” needs to 
be established (SIGIR, 2006, p. 95).  “The contracting process in Iraq 
reconstructions suffered from the variety of regulations applied by diverse agencies, 
which caused inconsistencies and inefficiencies that inhibited management and 
oversight” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 95).  The lack of clarity among the US Army procurement 
organizations as to the applicability of the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation 
Supplement (DFARS) definition requirements for task orders issued under IDIQ 
contracts diminishes visibility and cost control over contractor costs by the 
government.  The incomplete nature of the content in the contract clauses database 
does not support the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulations requirement for 
ensuring that definitization occurs in a timely manner and subsequently cost controls 
are implemented. 
Current contingency contracts have been incrementally funded, causing a 
greater workload and inefficient operations.  The LOGCAP contract had 141 
incremental funding contract modifications in FY06.  “Funds metered out 
incrementally cause unnecessary and non-value-added workload to an already 
overloaded contracting workforce” (Commission, 2007, p. 25).  If a more efficient 
funding steam were available, the JCC-I/A would be able to negotiate better deals 
on contracts (Commission, 2007). 
Cost containment is essential for contract administration relating to funds 
control over the IRRF appropriation (SIGIR, 2006).  The US interagency community 
and private industry did not have adequate pre-war planning.  Contracting and 
procurement personnel should be included in all planning stages for operations 
(SIGIR, 2006).  There were no contracting personnel involved in the initial stages for 
OIF or OEF.  “Contracting plays a central role in the execution of contingency 
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Whether for stabilization or reconstruction operations, contracting officials help 
provide an accurate picture of the resources necessary to carry out the mission” 
(SIGIR, 2006, p. 98). 
d. Organization  
As outlined by the Gansler Commission, a key element to future success is to 
restructure contracting organization and restore responsibility to facilitate contracting 
and contract management in expeditionary and continental US operations 
(Commission, 2007).  The Army currently does not treat contracting as a core 
capability; it is treated as an operational and institutional side issue (Commission, 
2007).  “Viewing contingency contacting as a tactical function can inundate the 
battlefield with excessive contracting units” (D’Angelo et al, 2007, p. 2).  This can 
lead to the inefficient use of contracting resources, supply disruptions, ineffective 
support to the strategic objectives, and several policy and contract accountability 
chains (D’Angelo et al., 2007). 
The Army needs a single Army contracting command responsible for making 
contracting an “Army, high quality, and core competence” (Commission, 2007, p. 
101).  Currently, there are multiple commands that have responsibility for 
contracting, none of which have the responsibility to synchronize contracting below 
the Army Secretariat Level (Commission, 2007).  In the current environment, 
commanders and contractors have to deal with multiple HCAs/PARCs on policy 
issues (Commission, 2007).  A DoD-wide agency needs to be developed so that it 
can be a center of excellence for expeditionary contract management.  The agency 
should have the responsibility for all contract management for expeditionary 
contracting (Commission, 2007). 
There needs to be a “uniformed, rapidly-deployable expeditionary contracting 
force and standing Joint Contracting Command” (Commission, 2007, p. 105).  
Essential contracting and procurement roles and responsibilities need to be clearly 
defined and communicated to all participating agencies (SIGIR, 2006). “The failure 
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Iraq endeavor resulted in a subsequently fragmented system, thus foreclosing 
opportunities for collaborations and coordination on contracting and procurement 
strategies” (SIGIR, 2006, p. 94). 
C. Summary 
This chapter reviewed two recent and relevant reports that traced the 
evolution of the United States government’s contracting experience in Iraq and 
underscored systemic variations in the joint expeditionary contracting process.  In 
summary, both the 2006 SIGIR Report and the 2007 Gansler Report provided major 
recommendations to improve joint expeditionary contacting execution.  These 
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Table 1.   2006 SIGIR and 2007 Gansler Commission  
Report Recommendations  
(SIGIR, 2006; Commission, 2007) 
In the next chapter the researchers will incorporate selected 
recommendations (bold in Table 1) from the 2006 SIGIR Report and the 2007 
Gansler Commission Report, as well as observations, into an iterative, problem-
solving approach called the systems engineering process (SEP). Through the SEP, 
the authors will establish the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting 
Execution System and, within the JEBCES, present a Phase-based Acquisition 
Capability (PBAC) as an enabling concept for future joint effects-based contracting 
execution. 
2006 SIGIR Recommendations: 
1. Explore the creation of an enhanced contingency FAR. 
2. Pursue the institutionalization of special contracting programs. 
3. Include contracting staff at all phases of planning for contingency 
operations. 
4. Create a deployable reserve corps of contracting personnel who are 
trained to execute rapid relief and reconstruction contracting during 
contingency operations. 
5. Develop and implement information systems for managing contracting and 
procurement in contingency operations. 
6. Pre-compete and pre-qualify a diverse pool of contractors with 
specialized reconstruction areas. 
2007 Gansler Commission Recommendations: 
1.  Increase stature, quantity, and career development of contracting 
personnel, both military and civilian (especially for expeditionary 
operations). 
2.  Restructure the contracting organization and restore responsibility to 
facilitate contracting and contract management in expeditionary and 
CONUS operations. 
3.   Provide training and tools for overall contracting activities in 
expeditionary contracting operations. 
4.   Obtain legislative, regulatory, and policy assistance to enable contracting 
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IV. Joint Effects-Based Contracting Execution 
System (JEBCES) 
A. Introduction  
Chapter II of this project highlighted the strategic significance of a Joint 
Contracting Command (JCC), using innovative EBC methodologies to support the 
CCDR’s campaign plan.  For example, after kinetic forces cleared entrenched 
neighborhoods in Baghdad, EBC methodologies enabled post-kinetic operations to 
follow shortly thereafter.  Conversely, Chapter III identified the negative impacts 
caused by variations in requirements definitions, service-unique TTPs, and 
inefficient business processes.  Against the backdrop of Chapters II and III, this 
chapter presents the framework for the Joint Effects-based Contracting Execution 
System (JEBCES), and within the JEBCES, a researcher-proposed Phased-based 
Acquisition Capability (PBAC).  Before presenting PBAC, it is essential to 
understand the desired effects of each joint EBC contracting execution stakeholder.  
The authors used the Department of Defense Systems Management College’s 
(DSMC’s) 2001 Fundamentals of Systems Engineering to accomplish this, thereby 
establishing the general framework for the JEBCES. 
B. Overview of JEBCES Systems Engineering   
Systems engineering (SE) provides the framework for an integrated 
composite of people, products, and processes to deliver a capability to meet the 
customer’s need.  DSMC defines the systems engineering process (SEP) as “an 
iterative problem-solving process to transform needs and requirements into a set of 
system products” (Defense Systems Management College, 2001). In other words, 
the SEP seeks to identify the requirements of each member’s internal processes to 
facilitate the development of the external capability to meet the warfighters’ needs. 
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functional analysis, synthesis, systems analysis and control, and finally, process 
outputs. 
 
Figure 9.   Systems Engineering Processes  
(Defense Systems Management College, 2001) 
C. Process Inputs (Stakeholder Requirements) 
From CCOs with varying degrees of experience and service-unique TTPs for 
employment to offices like the SIGIR in Chapter III that audit the contracting process, 
there are numerous stakeholders within the joint expeditionary contracting 
environment; each with  different needs (or desired effects) from the same 
contracting execution system.  For example, comptrollers and budgeting officers 
desire transparency and accountability of all US-appropriated funds throughout the 
operation.  Although not exhaustive, Table 2 presents the authors’ stakeholder 
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people, product, or process requirements in order to facilitate the stakeholders’ 
direct support of strategic objectives.   
Stakeholder Desired Effects
CCDR Time-definite contracting to support strategic objectives of campaign plan and 
visibility of CAF within Combined Joint Area of Operation (CJOA)
Warfighter Menu of defined requirements during contingencies 
JCC Commander Trained and equipped joint expeditionary contracting force
Contingency Contracting Officers Standard TTPs
Comptrollers Effective budget execution  
Contracting Officer  Representatives Standard TTPs to enable responsive contract oversight
Contractors Assisting the Force Payment for goods and services and phase-based demand data to support 
inventories and forecasting of goods and services
Host Nation Transparent and transferable procurement processes
Defense Contract Management Agency Complete contract files to conduct contract administration
Non-Governmental Organizations Coordination and synchronization of contracting activities
U.S. Interagency Community Interoperablity 
Congress Appropriations Transparency and Accountability 
 
Table 2.   JEBCES Stakeholders and Desired Effects 
1. Combatant Commander: EBC and CAF Accountability 
As seen in Table 2, the CCDR requires time-definite delivery of supplies and 
services to the strategic objectives of the campaign plan.  Additionally, the CCDR 
needs in-theater visibility of Contractors Assisting the Force (CAF).  According to the 
GAO, “the DOD’s use of contractors to provide supplies and services to deployed 
U.S. Forces has grown significantly to the extent the force in Iraq is composed of 
approximately 143,000 military personnel and 149,000 contractor personnel” (Kohn 
& Hutton, 2008, p.1).  “The presence of contractor personnel—hired by various 
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United States in overseeing contractors and managing the combat zone” 
(Congressional Budget Office, 2008, p.15). 
2. Warfighter: Defined Requirements 
For the warfighter, the greatest need during joint expeditionary contracting 
operations is requirements definition.  Given the high operations tempo during such 
phases like the dominate phase and the supporting role requirements in subsequent 
phases, the last thing the warfighter needs is another process to maneuver through 
while maneuvering through the battle space to accomplish mission objectives.  
Moreover, events such as Reliefs in Place and Transfers of Authority (RIP/TOA) 
further exacerbate the requirements definition process—specifically, when incoming 
units attempt to identify when service contracts such as internal security or dining 
facility services expire.  RIP/TOA is the process in which one military unit replaces 
another. 
3. JCC Commander: Trained and Equipped CCOs 
The JCC Commander requires trained and equipped CCOs to deliver efficient 
and effective contract support for kinetic and post-kinetic reconstruction operations.  
Gansler highlights the fact that some joint CCOs do not have the required training 
and skills when they arrive in theater (Commission on Army Acquisition, 2007). 
4. CCOs: Standard TTPs 
As previously discussed in Chapter III, the Commission on Army Acquisition 
recommended tools and training for overall contracting activities in expeditionary 
contracting operations.  Given the level of contracting complexity within the CJOA, 
CCOs need standard TTPs to absorb variations in US interagency-specific and inter-
service approaches to training, contracting execution methodologies, and business 
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5. Comptrollers: Transparency and Accountability  
“Comptrollers manage the planning, programming, budgeting, and execution 
systems at all levels.  They provide resource advice and guidance to 
commanders, activity chiefs, and other Army leaders.  Comptrollers issue 
instructions for, develop, and prepare the program and budget.  They also 
monitor execution of the program/budget at all resource management 
echelons” (Functional Area 45 Comptroller’s Development Guide, 2003, p. 1).  
In joint expeditionary contracting environments, the desired effect is effective 
budget execution and appropriations transparency. 
6. Contracting Officer Representatives: Standard TTPs 
Contracting Officer Representatives (CORs) serve as the CCO’s eyes and 
ears within the CJOA and need standard TTPs to ensure effective contracting 
oversight.  This is further highlighted under a recent amendment to section 2333 of 
title 10 U.S.C, in which it “directed joint policies for contingency contracting provide 
for the training of military personnel outside the acquisition workforce who are 
expected to have acquisition responsibilities including contracts or contractors during 
combat operations, post-conflict operations, and contingency operations” (Kohn & 
Hutton, 2008 p. 2). 
7. Contractors Assisting the Force (CAF): Predictability 
From logistical support to life-support services such as billeting and dining 
facilities, CAF provide a broad array of services to military operations. During most 
contingency operations, CAF are typically not paid on time and need better payment 
processes, mechanisms to quantify risk, and well-defined requirements.  According 
to a group of contractors interviewed by the Gansler Commission: 
[B]ecause of uncertainties that exist in high threat environments like Iraq, they 
are pressured to price their risk into firm-fixed price contracts rather than 
being permitted to propose under cost-reimbursement terms and conditions 
that would make it easier to factor risk into the price. Government contracting 
officials who believe traditional practices in requirements planning, contract 
award, and contract management processes have often found, after it is too 
late to recover, that a traditional approach is ill-suited for the non-traditional 
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8. Host Nation: Transferable EBC Processes 
Based on the existing model within the JCC-I/A, selected CCOs are 
embedded in executing ministries of the GOI (such as the ministry of the interior) to 
coach, mentor, and teach fundamental procurement processes. This is particularly 
important under both the stabilize phase and the enable civil authority phase of 
future campaign plans, when the joint force is in a supporting role to newly 
established democratic governments.  As the HN matures, the procurement 
processes need to be easily transferable.  
9. DCMA: Standard TTPs 
The DCMA provides administrative support to CCOs for large dollar, complex 
contracts.  This includes the Air Force’s Air Force Civilian Augmentation Program 
and the Army’s LOGCAP contract, which provide base operations support and 
construction services during the initial phases of a deployment.  In light of the 
significant logistical role the DCMA has in administering theater-wide logistical 
support, it is imperative that they be involved in requirements definition and 
operational planning.  The desired effect for the DCMA is for CCOs to minimize 
variations in contracting processes and for better contract file management.  For 
example, in Chapter III, SIGIR identified a number of missing contract files during an 
inspection. In this instance, standard TTPs would provide the framework for the 
solution. 
10. NGOs: Independence and Synchronization 
NGOs require the independence as well as the ability to synchronize efforts 
within the AOR. However, under unique circumstances NGOs may have to rely on 
the CAF to assist in relief operations. For example, as kinetic forces move 
throughout the stabilize phase and post-kinetic operations begin, NGOs may have to 
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11. International Community: Interoperability  
The desired effect of the international community is interoperability.  For 
example, during the 2006 International Security Assistance Force TOA in 
Afghanistan, International Security Assistance Forces had difficulties integrating their 
funding streams into existing procurement systems. 
12. Congress: Transparency & Accountability 
The United States Congress requires transparency and accountability of 
appropriated funds during contingency operations. For example:  
When the U.S. Congress appropriated funds for Iraq relief and reconstruction, 
it also passed legislation to create a specialized Inspector General to provide 
accountability for the use of these funds. Public Law 108-106, the Emergency 
Supplemental Appropriations Act for Defense and for the Reconstruction of 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2004, appropriated $18 billion for the Iraq Relief and 
Reconstruction Fund (IRRF). (SIGIR, 2006, p. 46) 
D. Requirements Analysis 
After conducting a stakeholder analysis, the next step in the SEP, as seen in 
Figure 9, is to analyze the process inputs.  “Requirements analysis is used to 
develop functional and performance requirements; that is, customer requirements 
are translated into a set of requirements that define what the system must do and 
how well it must perform” (Defense Systems Management College, 2001, p. 31).  A 
recent requirement, from a policy standpoint, is found in section 2333 of title 10 US 
Code, where Congress directed the Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the 
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to develop joint policies by April 2008 for 
requirements definition, contingency program management, and contingency 
contracting during combat and post-combat operations.  
Additionally, in January 2008, the National Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2008 amended section 2333 to add a new subparagraph directing that  
these joint policies provide training of personnel outside of the acquisition 
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oversight of contract or contractors during combat operations and post-
conflict operations and contingency operations. (Kohn & Hutton, 2008, p. 2) 
At the operational and tactical levels, the system must address the 
stakeholders’ desired effects as identified in Table 2.  With this information, the 
researchers conclude the JEBCES must: 
 Standardize a high percentage of kinetic and post-kinetic requirements 
for warfighters 
 Provide  the framework for contingency program management  
 Optimize the CAF’s supply chain  
 Utilize contracting resources efficiently  
 Manage contracting knowledge throughout all phases of the campaign 
plan 
 Absorb variations in requirements definitions and CCO contract 
execution methodologies 
E. Functional Analysis 
Given the stakeholders’ desired effects and requirements analysis, the next 
step is to conduct a functional analysis.  Figure 10 presents the authors’ functional 





do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 10 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
 
Figure 10.   JEBCES Functional Analysis 
1. Function A: Standardize Requirements 
Based on the requirements of both the warfighter and CCOs, the JEBCES 
must standardize a high percentage of both kinetic and post-kinetic requirements to 
provide a common set of requirements throughout all phases of future campaign 
plans. 
2. Function B: Optimize CAF’s Supply Chain 
In order to optimize the CAF’s supply chain, the JEBCES must provide CAF 
with phase-based demand data.  CAF can use this to forecast demand and provide 
the DOD with significant savings through economies of scale.  As relayed in their 
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approach to contingency contracting, wherein the DOD can identify strategic 
sourcing opportunities using Kraljic’s Model. The model categorizes the enterprise-
wide spend categories based on strategic importance.  
3. Function C: Utilize CCO Resources Efficiently 
As a major system function, the JEBCES must utilize CCOs efficiently.  
Yoder’s (2004) CCO optimization model suggests that the current acquisition and 
contracting community is providing the COCOM sub-optimized, ad-hoc contracted 
theater support (Yoder, 2005).  In Figure 11, Yoder explains his model this way:   
The Yoder three-tier calls for the cultivation and utilization of senior officers 
and civilians with sufficient education, joint qualification, multi-discipline 
DAWIA certifications and other professional qualifications to perform at the 
highest integrative-planning and execution levels.  At the highest level, the 
Integrative Planner and Executor (IPE) is the essential and critical lynch-pin 
allowing for the development of a comprehensive Contingency Contracting 
Support Plan that integrates contracting with the broader theater objectives in 
the Operation Plan (Yoder, 2004, p. 20). 
The Yoder three-tier model (YTTM) recommends employment of contingency 
contracting officers as listed in Figure 11 below. As described in the “Yoder three-tier 
model, each tier performs unique functions, requires specific education, developed 
skill sets, and unique personnel and manpower characteristics” (Yoder, 2004, p. 24).  
This model maximizes effectiveness and efficiency of theater contingency 
contracting by assigning the appropriate level of training and experience to the 









do^ar^qb=p`elli=lc=_rpfkbpp=C=mr_if`=mlif`v= = - 12 - 
k^s^i=mlpqdo^ar^qb=p`elli=
Model Tier Level 
& Model Title 
Functions/Education/Rank Highlights and Drawbacks 
 
Ordering Officer 
– Tier One 
• Basic ordering 
• Some simplified acquisitions 
• Training: DAU CON 234 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level I or 
II 
• Junior to mid-enlisted, junior 
officers, GS-7 to GS-9 1102 
series civilians 
• Simple buys 
• Little integration 
• No operational planning 





Officer – Tier 
Two 
• Leverages to local economy 
• Reduces “pushed” material 
support 
• Training/education: DAU CON 
234, recommended higher 
education 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level II or 
III 
• Senior enlisted, junior to mid-
grade officers, GS-11+ 1102 
series civilians 
• Better local operational 
planning 
• Some integration 
• More capability for the 
operational commander 
• No planned theater 
integration 
• No broad liaison functions 
• May perform to optimize 
local operations at the 




Executor (IPE) – 
Tier Three 
• Highest level of planning and 
integration – joint 
• Linked/integrated with J-4 and J-
5 
• Creates and executes OPLAN 
CCO strategy 
• Provides direction to tier two and 
one 
• Links operations strategically to 
theater objectives of COCOM 
• Education: Master’s degree or 
higher and JPME Phase I and II 
• DAWIA Certified CON Level III 
and other DAWIA disciplines 
(LOG, ACQ, FIN, etc) 
• Senior officers (O-6+), senior 
civilians, GS-13+ or SES 
• Performs operational and 
theater analysis, 
integrates results into 
OPLAN 
• Link between CCDR and 
OPLAN to all theater 
contracting operations 
• Coordinates theater 
objectives with best 
approach to contracted 
support 
• Can achieve broader 
national security goals 
through effective 
distribution of national 
assets 
• Includes planning, 
communication, 
coordination, and 
exercising with NGO and 
PVO in theater 
Figure 11.   Yoder Three-tier Model for  
Contingency Contracting Operations  
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4. Function D: Rapidly Deployable 
Another function of the JEBCES is to be rapidly deployable.  A major 
recommendation of the SIGIR Report is to  
develop deployable contracting and procurement systems before mobilizing 
for post-conflict efforts and test that they can effectively be implemented in 
contingency situations.  After reconstruction operations began in Iraq, 
contracting entities developed ad-hoc operating systems and procedures for 
monitoring contracts and maintaining contracting and procurement histories; 
this limited contracting efficiency and led to inconsistent documentation of 
contracting actions, (SIGIR, 2006, p. 95) 
5. Function E: Transferable 
Under the enable civil authority phase of OIF, JCC-I/A CCOs are embedded 
with the host nation to coach, mentor, and teach procurement processes.  The 
authors contend that a transferable procurement capability would be a viable 
solution to previous experiences during the 2004 transition to the interim Iraq 
government.  Of grave concern for the CAF during this period was the ability of the 
interim Iraqi government to receive and administer contracts funded and executed 
under DOD procurement processes. 
6. Function F: Manage EBC Knowledge Base 
Institutional knowledge of the pre, during, and post-operational contracting 
environment is often lost during CCO turnovers, and is further exacerbated by the 
service-unique dwell-time requirements. For example, US Army CCOs have up to a 
one-year dwell-time requirement, while the US Air Force standard deployment time 
is six months.  The JEBCES must provide a common repository of corporate 
knowledge to incoming CCOs regarding strategic objectives, market conditions and 
after-action reports.   
7. Function G: Flexible 
Given the dynamic nature of the operational environment as it relates to 
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requirements side and the execution side.  Moreover, it should expand and contract 
throughout all phases of the campaign plan. 
F. Design Synthesis for Phased-based Acquisition Capability 
(PBAC)   
The final step in the SEP is the design synthesis.  “Design synthesis is the 
process of defining the product item in terms of the physical and software elements, 
which together make up and define the item” (Defense Systems Management 
College, 2001, p. 32).  Given the complex stakeholder requirements and the above 
functional analysis, the authors adopted the United States Army’s contracting 
methodology for LOGCAP and USSOCOM IWSSP wherein a single contract with 
multiple contract line item (CLIN) “types” (cost and fixed price) supports the 
warfighter throughout the contingency as well as the weapon system for the 
remainder of its lifecycle.  Instead of establishing separate contracts for each 
modification of the major weapon system, multiple CLINs within the existing 
sustainment contract allow the business arrangement to expand and to contract 
based on requirements definition and program risk.  Moreover, it provides 
transparency into funding streams at the deliver order level.  Similarly, a PBAC with 
multiple CLIN types expands and contracts from the initial mobilization efforts during 
the deter phase to the transition of procurement processes in the enable civil 
authority phase—conceptually, the lifecycle of the operation.  
1. Rapid Acquisition Capability 
As a means of standardizing CCO execution methodologies,  
Section 811 of the FY 2005 National Defense Authorization Act grants the 
Secretary of Defense limited rapid acquisition authority to acquire goods and 
services during combat emergencies. Also Title 10, Section 2304 outlines the 
use of Indefinite Delivery/Indefinite Quantity task orders, sealed bidding, 
certain actions, and set aside procurements under section 8(a) of the Small 
Business Act as examples of ways to expedite the delivery of goods and 
services during combat operations. (Congressional Research Service Report, 
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In their model, the authors proposed pre-competed, pre-awarded, multiple-
award indefinite delivery contracts.   
2. OIF FY07 Demand Data  
In order to establish a standard baseline of kinetic and post-kinetic 
operational requirements for the PBAC, the researchers grouped the FY07 
requirements data from the current Joint Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) 
into 45 categories using the guidance of the RAND Corporation Report titled 
Analyzing Contingency Contracting Purchases for Operation Iraqi Freedom (Table 1, 
Appendix 1).  The JCC-I/A executed over 37,000 contracting actions, totaling more 
than $5.3 billion in FY07.  Figure 12 presents FY07 requirements by purchase 
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Figure 12.   FY07 JCCS Contracting Actions by Purchase Category  
(Purchasing Categories Adapted From:  RAND, 2008) 
The data from the JCCS was categorized according to the definitions and 
breakdowns of the RAND report categories in Appendix 2.  Included in the table is a 
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description field of the JCCS.  Once the JCCS data was categorized, it was then 
grouped into four basic categories:  major construction, minor construction, 
commodities, and service.  These will serve as the kinetic and post-kinetic 
requirements baseline for the simulation and modeling in Chapter V. 
3. Bulk Funded Approach  
In an effort to align funding with the phase-related activities, the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provides for bulk funding: 
 Use bulk funding to the maximum extent practicable. Bulk funding is a system 
whereby the contracting officer receives authorization from a fiscal and accounting 
officer to obligate funds on purchase documents against a specified lump sum of 
funds reserved for the purpose for a specified period of time rather than obtaining 
individual obligational authority on each purchase document. Bulk funding is 
particularly appropriate if numerous purchases using the same type of funds are to 
be made during a given period (FAR 13.101(4)).  
 If kinetic and post-kinetic requirements were baselined, the DOD could bulk-
fund a high degree of common kinetic and post-kinetic requirements. For example, 
of the more than 30,000 contracting actions in Figure 12, 3,253 were for office 
supplies and equipment. Given level of demand, budget officers and warfighters 
could use this information to standardize office supplies into well-defined 
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Figure 13.   Phased-based Acquisition Capability  
(Phases Adapted From:  JP, 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, 2006) 
4. Phase 0 Shaping:  Integration and Synchronization  
Figure 13 illustrates the methodology from which to establish, integrate and 
synchronize the PBAC into the shaping phase (Phase 0).  Conceptually, phase-
based demand data would flow into a “JCCS-like” system, which can provide insight 
to bulk-funding opportunities as well as a present a high percentage of uniformed 
requirements definitions to warfighters.   CAF could then use this (phase-based 
demand/requirements data) to forecast and optimize inventories to support 
subsequent phases of the operation.  Armed with this data and pre-competed, pre-
awarded rapid acquisition capabilities such as multiple-award task orders or delivery 
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order contracts, future CCOs could enter the shape phase (Phase 0) with a PBAC 
where both military and interagency coordination for contingency operations begin.  
G. Summary 
In this chapter, the authors applied the fundamentals of the SEP to develop 
the intellectual framework for the JEBCES and the enabling capability, PBAC. 
Requirements analysis provided the reader with insight as to how different 
stakeholders have various requirements from the same effects-based contracting 
execution system.  After the requirements analysis, functional analysis identified how 
the JEBCES must function relative to the complex needs of each stakeholder, and 
yet still provide effects within the CJOA.  The next chapter will model and simulate a 
PBAC under the conditions of the enable civil authority phase (Phase IV) of the OIF 
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V. PBAC Modeling and Simulation   
A. Introduction 
The previous chapter introduced the framework for the JEBCES and within 
the system proposed a Phased-based Acquisition Capability (PBAC).  This chapter 
presents simulation and modeling of a PBAC by modeling the framework in which 
computer software replicates a real system to allow users the ability to analyze 
changes to current operations without having to make actual changes to the real 
system.  The use of simulation and modeling provides flexibility to the user by 
allowing statistical analysis of alternative scenarios in real-time, thus saving time and 
money.  Manufacturers successfully use simulation and modeling software to identify 
potential efficiencies hidden in undiscovered bottlenecks and wasteful processes 
(Model Performance, 2003).  In this chapter, the authors used Arena 10.0 Forward 
Business Solutions (simulation and modeling software) by Rockwell Software, Inc., 
to demonstrate how a PBAC provides uniformity and efficiency within a joint 
expeditionary contracting environment. The model demonstrates how total time-in-
system and CCO utilization can be improved through the use of a PBAC. 
In Table 4, the authors focused on two key elements in the joint expeditionary 
contracting environment to demonstrate the efficiencies of the PBAC:  the total time-
in-system for a purchase request (PR) and utilization rates of CCOs.  Total time-in-
system represents the amount of time it takes from the time the PR enters the 
acquisition process (through the field ordering officer, the Department of Finance, 
the Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB), or the contracting office) to the time the 
contract is awarded.  The utilization rates measure the efficiency of different levels of 
CCOs within the contracting process. 
B. Assumptions 
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 Staffing levels of all resources used in the model will remain constant 
during the period of conflict.   
 Uniformed kinetic and post-kinetic requirements are defined, 
forecasted and bulk funded.   
 There is a sufficient vendor base to satisfy all the contractual 
requirements.   
 CCOs will be proficient at the skill level assigned within the Yoder 
three-tier model (YTTM).    
 Scenarios were based on 165 CCOs working 15-17 hours per day, 
seven days per week.   
C. Data Analysis 
1. Data Origin 
The data the authors used for generating the distribution for use in the model 
is from the Joint Contracting Center Iraq/Afghanistan contract database.  The Joint 
Contingency Contracting System (JCCS) was developed to meet the needs of 
tracking contracting actions and to be used as a management tool to allocate 
command resources.  The original tool was a Microsoft Access database that was 
distributed to each of the contracting centers throughout the theater.  This was then 
modified by each of the contracting centers to meet their individual needs.  The 
contracting centers then sent copies of the data at the end of each month; these 
copies were then modified to a standard format from which the data was mined for 
reports as necessary.  The basic structure was used to develop a Structured Query 
Language (SQL) database in conjunction with the Business Transformation Agency 
(BTA), which used a standard format for all contracting centers.  The JCCS required 
that all data fields be completed and that the JCC I/A set command polices requiring 
time frames for data entry. 
2. Time Frame and Data 
The JCCS was first implemented in Iraq in December 2006.  Fiscal year 2007 
contract information was taken from the JCCS.  The system that was first initiated 
was a best-fit solution to meet the needs of the JCC I/A at that time.  Over the next 
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that needed to be captured yet was not initially anticipated.  There was a learning 
curve on what fields were to be required to ensure complete and accurate data.  The 
first complete fiscal year that was captured in one location for contingency 
contracting in Iraq was 2007. The data from the JCCS was categorized according to 
the definitions and breakdowns of the 2008-RAND Report: Analysis of Contingency 
Contracting for the United States Air Force categories listed in Exhibit 2.  
Those four basic categories are: 
a. Commodities:  a contract that engages a contractor whose primary 
purpose is to furnish an end item of supply. 
b. Services:  a contract that directly engages the time and effort of a 
contractor whose primary purpose is to perform an identifiable task rather than to 
furnish an end item of supply. 
c. Major Construction:  a project of $550,000 or greater and defined as 
the construction, alteration, or repair (including dredging, excavating, and painting) 
of buildings, structures, or other real property.  For purposes of this definition, the 
terms “buildings, structures, or other real property” include (but are not limited to) 
improvements of all types, such as bridges, dams, plants, highways, parkways, 
streets, subways, tunnels, sewers, mains, power lines, cemeteries, pumping 
stations, railways, airport facilities, terminals, docks, piers, wharves, ways, 
lighthouses, buoys, jetties, breakwaters, levees, canals, and channels. Construction 
does not include the manufacture, production, furnishing, construction, alteration and 
repair, processing, or assembling of vessels, aircraft, or other kinds of personal 
property. 
d. Minor Construction:  construction as defined in major construction 
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3. Format of Data 
There was no essential change to the format of the data.  The JCCS offers a 
download of the SQL database into Microsoft Excel for a given time period.  The 
database was queried for the FY07, and this data was used to generate the 
distribution used in the model.  The data was placed into a pivot table that allowed 
the information to be used by the authors.  The date was used to combine PRs for 
each category for the fiscal year.   
D. Current Procurement Model 
PRs are submitted by units to the contracting office for the purpose of 
acquiring construction, commodities, and/or services.  Each PR must pass through a 
series of reviews.  The first step is to determine the dollar value of the PR.  PRs with 
a dollar value less than $2,500 are ordered by the unit using a field ordering officer 
(FOO). FOOs are appointed by warfighting units and then trained by the CCOs to 
purchase items less than $2,500.  PRs with a dollar value from $2,500 to $200,000 
are routed for funding and then proceed to the contracting office to be put on 
contract.  PRs exceeding $200,000 must pass a validation process for approval and 
funding.  Those that are approved are forwarded to the contracting office and enter 
into the standard, serial contracting process (e.g., receive funded requirements 
package, solicit offers, evaluate proposals, award and administer contract).  
Depending on contract type the contract may go through administration or may be 
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Figure 14.   Current Operational Customer Requirements Flow  
(JCC-I/A, 2006) 
E. Proposed PBAC Model under the JEBCES 
Each PR must pass through a series of reviews.  For requirements over 
$2,500, the first step is to determine if the item requested is on the researcher-
proposed PBAC.  If the requirement is ordered from the PBAC using YTTM-I CCO, 
the items are delivered to the unit. Requirements not on the PBAC follow the existing 
process and are handled by CCOs according to their dollar value.  The PBAC model 
is shown in Exhibit 1 ( purple-dotted line).  The processing time distributions for field 
ordering officers, purchase request and commitment (PR&C), Joint Acquisition 
Review Board, administration, and menu contracting were based on the authors’ 
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for these processes. The processing time distribution for the contracting office is 
based on FY07 data collected by the JCC I/A. 
1. Processes   
The time for each process is based on the entity type. 
 PRs under $2,500 are ordered by a unit FOO. The ordering time is 
dependent on the purchase category, namely construction, 
commodities, or services. The processing time distribution for PRs 
under this category is approximately one to three days and is based on 
the authors’ contingency contracting experiences. 
 A PR that is on the PBAC is ordered by a YTTM-I CCO.  Depending 
upon the purchase category (construction, commodities, or services), 
the ordering time ranges from four to eight days. 
 A finance officer through the PR&C process funds orders over $2,500 
but less than $200,000.  
 PRs requiring Joint Acquisition Review Board (JARB) approval and 
funding go through an application process that requires unit request 
and leadership approval.  This process requires a board of officers that 
approves or disapproves requirements. 
 Funded PRs are given to the supporting RCC for award.  The PRs are 
assigned to an appropriate CCO depending on the dollar amount of the 
award. 
 PRs requiring administration are assigned to the appropriate 
contracting officer for administration. 
The proposed models were run under different experiments.  A separate 
simulation was run to test the resource utilization and cycle-times with a different 
percentage of contracts being handled through the PBAC. 
F. Tools for Analysis 
Analysis of system performance was done using the Theory of Constraints 
(TOC) and Little’s Law, both of which were described in Chapter I.  The TOC 
proposes that in any multi-stage processing system, one stage will be slower than 
the others (McMullen, 1998). One set of researchers explains, “TOC capitalizes on 
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the importance of timely delivery, as opposed to the achievement of individual tasks 
or milestones within a processing system” (Neu, Davenport, & Smith, 2007, p. 13).  
They continue by asserting that “Applying the five steps of TOC can reduce the 
effects of a constraint by guiding the manager to continually evaluate the system to 
determine bottlenecks and to synchronize the system to that constraint” (Neu, et al., 
2007, p.14). 
The authors’ model will focus on decreasing the overall time it takes to get a 
PR through the entire process by utilizing Little’s Law.  If the authors decrease the 
overall system time, more PRs can be processed.  
Cycle-time is the time it takes a unit (or PR) to go through the system.  
Throughput is the average number of jobs [PRs] that pass through the system per 
unit of time.  Inventory is the number of jobs [PRs] within the system boundaries at a 
particular point in time (Apte et al., 2006).  Researchers Brandy and Godfrey (2005) 
explain, “Little’s Law generally is best understood when it is used to reduce cycle-
times (flow-times), while TOC leads quickly to being able to identify and elevate a 
physical constraint (bottleneck) to increase throughput (flow rates)” (p. 37). 
Through the use of Little’s Law and the TOC the authors can satisfy the 
customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered product or service, 
as well as minimize the administrative operating costs. 
G. Summary 
The two simulation models were created using Arena 10.0 software.  One 
included the new PBAC and one modeled the current contracting process.  For the 
purpose of analysis, the current contracting process will serve as the base model for 
all comparisons.  The next chapter will discuss and analyze the results from the 
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VI. Analysis and Results 
A. Introduction 
The PBAC model outlined in Chapter V allowed for comparative analysis 
between the proposed and existing joint expeditionary contracting processes.  The 
results were then compared and analyzed with an emphasis towards meeting the 
intent outlined in FAR Part 1.102-2 (a) Satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, 
and timeliness of the delivered product or service, and (b) Minimize administrative 
operating costs (General Services Administration, 2005).  To improve the four 
measurements of cost, quality, timeliness and minimizing administrative operating 
costs, the authors used a combination of Little’s Law and the Theory of Constraints 
in the model.  The measurements are defined for use herein as: 
Cost:  Cost for warfighter satisfaction will be comparable to market conditions 
comparable to the quantities ordered. 
Quality:  Acceptable for use by the warfighter for the intended purpose. 
Timeliness:  Is delivered on or before the warfighters’ required delivery date.  
The comparison for timeliness in the model is a delivery time less than the 
actual measured delivery time. 
Minimizing Administrative Operating Cost: Provide uniformity and 
efficiency that ensures fairness and predictability in the procurement system.   
The purpose of the authors’ proposed model is to demonstrate that the PBAC 
can satisfy the customer in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness, and can minimize 
both administrative costs as well as the burden on personnel by creating uniformity 
and efficiency in the joint expeditionary contingency contracting execution process. 
The data presented in this chapter shows, through the implementation of the 
PBAC framework, significant savings in the time it takes to process PRs.  This 
results in quicker delivery of goods and services to meet the warfighters’ operational 
requirements.  The data also shows an increase in the utilization of tier 1 contracting 
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effect then results in more experienced contracting officers focusing on theater-wide 
strategic planning for kinetic and post-kinetic operations. 
B. Results 
The base model represents the current contracting process utilized in a 
contingency environment.  The four experiments were run as the authors changed 
the percentage of contracts going through the PBAC.  The percent of utilization of 
the PBAC for each experiment was incrementally changed to 10%, 25%, 50%, and 
75%, respectively.  The data was then analyzed to determine total time-in-system for 
each entity and utilization rates for each of the CCO types described in Yoder’s 
three-tier model in Chapter III. 
C. Total Time-in-System 
The total time-in-system was expressed in days and each experiment was 
compared to the base model.  The model gave a total time-in-system for each type 
of entity (or PR).  When the authors standardized requirements and utilized the 
PBAC, the average total time-in-system decreased for each PR type. For example, 
by standardizing 10% of the commodity PRs into the PBAC, the total time-in system 
decreased by 12.2%.  At the 75% standardized requirements level, the total time-in-
system decreased by an average of 76% across all categories, with the greatest 
decrease realized in commodities at 84%. The complete results for total time-in-
system are depicted in Table 3 below.  The steady reduction in the total time-in-
system directly represents the efficiencies of the PBAC structure and is largely 
explained by the increase of standardized kinetic and post-kinetic operational 
requirements through use of the PBAC model.  One of the keys to this research was 
to illustrate how the PBAC model can improve uniformity and efficiency in the 
contingency contracting process and in turn, reduce costs and administrative burden 
of the CCOs during contingencies. 
The total time-in-system for commodities is shown in the first column by each 
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44.5 days.  With 10% of PRs going to the PBAC, the total time-in-system decreased 
to 39.07 days, showing a decrease in the total time-in-system of commodities of 
12% (column 2).  This format is the same for the total time-in-system for major 
construction in columns 3 and 4, for the total time-in-system for minor construction in 
columns 5 and 6, and for the total time-in-system for services in columns 7 and 8.  
Major construction’s total time-in-system was decreased by 21%, minor 
construction’s time was decreased by 9%, and the total time-in-system for services 







































in cycle- time 
compared to 
base model 
         
Base 44.50   136.40  35.20  48.80  
10% 
on 
PBAC 39.07 0.12 107.90 0.21 32.10 0.09 43.30 0.11 
25% 
on 
PBAC 31.60 0.29 81.60 0.40 27.50 0.22 36.10 0.26 
50% 
on 
PBAC 18.24 0.59 49.50 0.64 18.60 0.47 23.01 0.53 
75% 
on 
PBAC 6.90 0.84 33.30 0.76 10.90 0.69 11.80 0.76 
 
Table 3.   Total Time in System. 
D. Contingency Contracting Officer Utilization Rates 
Utilization rates represent the percentage of time a contracting officer is busy 
processing PRs and awarding contracts.  Under the base model structure, YTTM tier 
II and III CCOs carry the highest burden for awarding and managing PRs regardless 
of dollar value or complexity.  Under the PBAC structure, lower dollar value and less 
complex requirements are standardized.  Such standardization allows for greater 
utilization of YTTM-I CCOs.  As the data shows, when higher percentages of 
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increase.  As a result, utilization rates for YTTM-IIs and IIIs decrease.  The complete 
results for utilization rates for YTTM-I, -II and -III CCOs are depicted in Table 4 
below. 
Utilization rates for YTTM Tier I CCOs are shown in column one by each 
simulation run.  The utilization of YTTM-I CCOs for the base model was .8%. With 
10% of PRs passing through the PBAC, the utilization rate increased to 2.9%, 
showing an increase in utilization of YTTM-I CCOs of 2.1% (column 2).  This format 
is the same for the utilization of YTTM-II CCOs in columns 3 and 4, and for the 
utilization of YTTM-III CCOs in columns 5 and 6.  YTTM-II CCO’s utilization rate 
decreased by 6.7%, and YTTM-III CCO’s utilization decreased by .9% with the same 
change of 10% of PRs going to the PBAC. 
Table 4.   YTTM CCO Utilization Rates. 
Table 4 demonstrates the affect of the PBAC model on the utilization rates of 
the most experienced CCOs.  The PBAC model is designed to shift the standard 
kinetic and post-kinetic requirements to YTTM-I CCOs, thus freeing up YTTM-II and 
-IIIs to focus on complex theater-wide requirements . 
Model 
Utilization 
Rates for      
YTTM Tier 
I CCOs  
% Change 
compared to Base 
Model 
Utilization 
Rates for       












       
Base 0.008  0.878  0.882  
10%  on 
PBAC 
  0.029 0.021 0.811 -0.067 0.873 -0.009 
25% on 
PBAC 
 0.066 0.058 0.709 -0.102 0.872 -0.001 
50% on 
PBAC 
 0.148 0.140 0.536 -0.173 0.871 -0.001 
75% on 
PBAC 
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E. Summary 
This chapter demonstrated that when the authors utilize the PBAC framework 
the data shows they can achieve efficiencies in processing time, and resources in 
processing time and resource utilization can be achieved.  With the ability to group 
common kinetic and post-kinetic requirements under more theater-wide contracts, 
the efficiency of the procurement system will result in lower costs and administrative 
burden while increasing support to the warfighter.  In the next chapter, the authors 
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VII. Summary, Conclusions, and Areas for 
Further Research  
This chapter provides an overview of the effectiveness of EBC methodologies 
within OIF and the framework to provide uniformity and efficiency in a joint 
expeditionary contracting execution.  This chapter ends with areas for future 
research.  
A. Summary 
This project provided the initial study on the framework for the Joint Effects-
based Contracting Execution System (JEBECES)—an integrated composite of 
people, products, and processes to deliver an acquisition capability to meet the 
warfighters’ need.  Within this framework, the researchers proposed a Phased-
based Acquisition Capability (PBAC) as an enabling concept to absorb variations in 
warfighter requirements definitions and CCO execution methodologies, thereby 
providing uniformity and efficiency in future joint EBC contracting execution. 
Chapter II introduced and explored the JCC-I/A’s EBC methodologies under 
the enable civil authority phase of the OIF.  The JCC-I/A integrated warfighter 
campaign plans to synchronize tactical contracting efforts to support the strategic 
objectives of the CCDRs by developing a concept of support, identifying key players, 
knowing the warfighters’ battle rhythm, ensuring visibility by being the right planning 
evolution, and having flexibility with the enterprise.  For example, by using EBC 
methodologies, the JCC-I/A provided time-definite delivery of essential supplies one 
to three days after kinetic forces cleared the neighborhoods of Baghdad during 
Operation Together Forward I. 
Chapter III reviewed SIGIR’s 2006 account of the contracting experience in 
Iraq under the previous phases:  deter, seize dominate, and stabilize (Phases I-IV), 
respectively.  Moreover, the researchers conducted an analysis of the major 
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misalignment and expose the fertile ground of opportunities for both warfighters and 
CCOs to provide effects under all phases of future campaign plans.  The authors 
reviewed the 2007 Gansler Commission Report and highlighted systemic variations 
such as each service’s TTPs for CCO training and development.  Selected 
recommendations from both reports were incorporated as inputs into an iterative, 
problem-solving process called the systems engineering process (SEP) in Chapter 
IV.  
Chapter IV presented the SEP fundamentals such as process inputs, 
stakeholder analysis, functional analysis, and design synthesis, and with them 
provided the general framework for the JEBCES.   Given that stakeholders from 
warfighters to comptrollers have different needs from the same JEBCES, the 
researchers proposed transforming a baseline of kinetic and post-kinetic operational 
requirements into a PBAC and standardizing rapid acquisition methods, thereby 
providing uniformed requirements definitions to the warfighter and standard 
contracting execution methodologies to CCOs.  
Chapter V simulated the cycle-time of processing FY07 JCC-I/A kinetic and 
post-kinetic requirements data through the current joint expeditionary contracting 
process to establish a baseline, and then through the proposed PBAC to identify 
efficiencies.  The authors conducted four experiments based on the extent to which 
requirements were standardized.  For example, the authors assumed 10% of kinetic 
and post-kinetic requirements (commodities such as office supplies) were defined, 
forecasted, and bulk funded,  the result was a 12.2% decrease in the total time the 
requirement was in the contingency contracting execution system.  In the last 
experiment kinetic and post-kinetic requirements were set at the 75% standardized 
requirements level.  As a result, total system time decreased by an average of 76%, 
with the greatest decrease realized in commodities at 84%. 
Chapter VI analyzed the results of the simulation.  The data suggests to the 
extent kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements are standardized, the DOD 
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customer (warfighter) in terms of cost, quality, and timeliness of the delivered 
product or service, as well as minimize administrative operating costs during 
contingency operations.  
B. Conclusions 
This Master of Business Administration Professional Report presented the 
general framework for the JEBCES and simulation and modeling of a proposed a 
PBAC as a concept that provides uniformed requirements definitions to warfighters 
and a standard rapid acquisition methodology for CCOs.  As a result of this research 
effort, the authors have reached the following conclusions:  
1. Conclusion 1 
Transforming a baseline of common kinetic and post-kinetic 
requirements into a PBAC improves joint expeditionary contracting execution.  
Simulation results in Chapter VI revealed a significant reduction in the total time a 
requirement spends in the system using the PBAC.  When compared to the base 
model, a 10% baseline of common requirements under PBAC (such as the 638 
generator requests in Figure 12) reduced total system time to process the requests 
by 12.2%.  The data from experiment four further suggests if operational customers 
are willing to standardize common kinetic and post-kinetic requirements a 75% level, 
warfighters can realize up to 76% reduction in cycle-time to process requirements.    
2. Conclusion 2 
The JEBCES provides the framework for the DOD to better align funding 
to enable responsive expeditionary contract support. The Federal Acquisition 
Regulation provides for bulk funding, whereby the CCO receives authorization from 
a fiscal and accounting officer to obligate funds on purchase documents against a 
specified lump sum of funds.  If a high percentage of kinetic and post-kinetic 
requirements are standardized, budget officers could then use phase-based demand 
data to forecast and bulk-fund future requirements, thereby decreasing the time the 
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3. Conclusion 3 
The PBAC enables efficient and effective use of limited CCO resources. 
Simulation of the current process revealed a utilization rate of YTTM-I CCOs for the 
base model of .8%.  With 10% of PRs going through the PBAC, the utilization rate 
increased to 2.9%, showing an increase in utilization of YTTM-I CCOs of 2.1%.  As a 
result, YTTM-II CCO’s utilization rate decreased by 6.7% and YTTM-III CCO’s 
utilization decreased by .9%, which translates into more YTTM-I CCOs ordering 
more routine, common kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements such as 
office equipment and furniture, and more YTTM-II and III CCOs available to procure  
more complex, theater-wide requirements. 
C. Recommendations  
1. Recommendation 1 
Establish a working group comprised of the stakeholders in Chapter IV, Table 
2 to determine each stakeholder’s internal processes requirements and then 
incorporate them into the PBAC. For example, CAF require better payment 
processes during contingencies and predictability of requirements to establish 
inventories and transportation costs to better support the warfighter.  The intent 
would be to incorporate and integrate CAF’s processes into a PBAC to facilitate the 
transfer of phase-related demand data to better forecast demand and ensure time-
definite delivery of construction, services, and supplies to the warfighter. 
2. Recommendation 2 
Once each stakeholder’s internal processes are incorporated into the PBAC, 
conduct a full phase-based OIF spend analysis and develop a pre-awarded, rapid 
acquisition capability such as a multiple award indefinite delivery contract based on 
the phase-based spend analysis.  Organize, train, and equip future CCOs with 
limited experience around PBAC for joint effects-based contracting execution.  
Additionally, the full phase-based spend analysis for OIF could also provide for a 
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3. Recommendation 3 
Equip future CCOs with a PBAC and integrate them into the Phase 0 
(shaping phase) of future campaign plans. Given the amount interagency and 
multinational coordination required to shape the behavior of both allies and 
adversaries during this phase (United States Joint Forces Command, 2006), PBAC 
could provide framework to develop a strategic contracting capability.  Moreover, just 
as in how other capabilities such as the Abrams tank or F-15 provide for standard 
TTPs, the PBAC could provide for standard TTPs for CCOs to minimize variations in 
contracting execution methodologies. 
D. Research Questions Addressed 
The primary research question is:  does transforming a baseline of common 
kinetic and post-kinetic operational requirements into a standard PBAC improve joint 
expeditionary contracting execution?  
Based on the data, transforming a baseline of common kinetic and post-
kinetic operational requirements into a standard PBAC for joint expeditionary 
contracting execution would provide a high percentage of uniformed requirements 
definitions for the warfighter and standard rapid acquisition methodologies for CCOs.   
Outputs from the model that was developed by the researchers’ show conclusively 
that through its implementation, labor would reduce and response times would 
improve.  
The secondary research questions are addressed below: 
1. How can a PBAC provide for a percentage of uniformed 
warfighter requirements definitions? 
Figure 12 presents FY07 OIF requirements data. Of the over 30,000 
requests, 1,948 were for furniture and 1,019 were for appliances. Conceptually, on 
common requirements such as these, warfighters could use the demand data to 
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Furthermore, this data could provide for defined requirements in over 40 common 
purchase categories listed in Figure 12. 
2.  How can a PBAC provide for efficient use of limited contracting 
officer resources?   
The efficient use of limited contracting resources was modeled in Chapter V 
of this research project, and the results were analyzed in Chapter VI.  Chapter VI 
demonstrated that when utilizing the PBAC framework the data revealed significant 
efficiencies in processing time and also indicated that resource optimization can be 
achieved. With the ability to group common kinetic and post-kinetic requirements 
under pre-awarded, rapidly deployable acquisition capabilities, Level I CCOs could 
procure routine requirements under PBAC and release Level II and III CCOs to 
procure more complex requirements as well as integrate the warfighter’s operational 
planning cycles.     
3. What are the benefits of integrating and synchronizing a PBAC 
into Phase 0 (shaping phase) of the CCDRs campaign plan? 
Integrating and synchronizing CCOs into the shaping phase (Phase 0) with a 
capability could reduce the number of undesired effects throughout subsequent 
phases of the CCDR’s campaign plan. In OIF, the DOD and CCDRs alike did not 
realize the benefits of the JCC-I/A until almost four years after the OIF OPLAN 
activation.  Under the authors’ model, CCOs would be better prepared to execute 
the operational extension of the economic instrument of power (contracting) during 
the planning stages rather than building the capability during critical phases of the 
campaign plan, such as the shift from the dominate phase to the stabilize phase. 
4. How can the JEBCES establish the framework to enable 
responsive joint expeditionary contracting execution? 
The JEBCES provides the framework for an integrated composite of people, 
products, and processes to develop an acquisition capability to meet the warfighters’ 
need. Given that there are numerous stakeholders in the joint expeditionary 
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relates to elements of their internal processes that would, if unknown to CCOs, could 
delay the time-definite delivery of goods and services to the warfighter.     
E.  Areas for Further Research 
During the course of this research and analysis, the authors identified areas 
that needed further research that were outside the scope of this project.  They are: 
To conduct a full spend analysis of all phases of OIF to establish a baseline 
for strategic sourcing opportunities in the contingency environment.  An analysis of 
this data will provide the foundation for a high percentage of uniformed requirements 
definitions throughout all phases of future campaign plans. 
Evaluate the interoperability of a PBAC during disaster relief and 
humanitarian operations.  Disaster relief and humanitarian operations such as 
Hurricane Katrina provide significant demand data during all phases of relief 
operations.  Could a PBAC enable time-definite delivery of supplies and services by 
establishing uniformed requirements definitions and standard rapid acquisition 
methods during these critical times?  
Evaluate CAF’s supportability of PBAC requirements data.  CAFs use phase-
based demand data to better forecast time-definite delivery of supplies and services 
through all phases of the campaign plan.  Given this phase-based demand data, 
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Appendix 1. Modeling and Simulation of a Phase-
based Acquisition Capability 
Red-dotted line = current process 
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Appendix 2. Categories Used in these Analyses  
Category Examples 
Appliances Laundry (washers and dryers), 
Kitchen (refrigerators, kitchen ranges, microwave  
     ovens, dish washers),  
Miscellaneous (water heaters, air conditioners,  
     ceramic heaters, ice machines) 
Billeting Services Billeting (apartment rental, leasing of rooms), 
Downtown stays (hotel lodging, room bills) 
Buildings and 
Shelters 
Residential buildings (living quarters, trailers), 
Structures (clamshell buildings, dome structures), Pre-
fabricated facilities (storage buildings, shower 
     trailers, field showers, Water-treatment plants) 
Cleaning Supplies Cleansers (detergents, dishwashing liquid, laundry 
     soap, glass cleaner), 
Cleaning supplies (rags, brushes, rubber gloves, 
     brooms, mops) 
Communication 
Equipment 
Local area network equipment (server, high-speed 
     network equipment Ethernet catalyst switches 
     [Ethernet equipment other than cards], coaxial  
     cable, data cable, Cisco switches, fiber optic items,  
     routers, Linksys boxes, X-port switches, Secret  
     Internet Protocol Router Network [SIPRNET]  
     equipment), 
Communication systems (news dishes, uninterruptible  
     power supply systems, videoconference  
     equipment), 









Computers (desktops, laptops, keyboards, mice,  
     computer monitors, computer speakers), 
Computer drives (hard drives, memory sticks), 
Computer accessories (personal digital assistants, 
     scanners, CD burners, DVD burners, computer  
     power supply), 
Server connections (9 USB hubs and cables, Ethernet 
     cards, modems), 
Software (Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Windows licenses) 
Construction, Heavy 
Equipment 
Backhoes, loaders, bulldozers, dump trucks,  
     excavators, graders, trenchers 
Construction 
Services 
Preparation (soil stabilization, clearing, digging, soil  
     surveys), 
Building (construction work, road construction, ramp  
     construction), 
Clearing (demolition/teardown, tree removal), 
Miscellaneous (airfield marking, sandbag services, 
     various renovations and upgrades, installation of  
     equipment, connect/install generators) 
Construction 
Supplies 
Hardware (nails, screws, nuts, bolts, washers), 
Construction material (steel, concrete, cement, asphalt, 
     wood, plywood, sand rock, gravel, 2x4s, planks,  
     crossbeams), 
Electrical material (circuit boards, grounding material,  
     cable), 
Plumbing material (pipe, toilets), 
Finishing material (carpet, floor covering, tile, sealant,  
     stains, paint, painting equipment, bathroom 
     fixtures), 
Runway construction and repair material, 
Miscellaneous (ladders, culverts, manhole covers,  
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Category Examples 
Custodial and Latrine 
Services 
Cleaning (latrine trailers, hangars), 
Custodial services, 
Janitorial services 
Dining Supplies Cooking utensils (spatulas, spaghetti tongs, can  
     openers, cooking thermometers), 
Kitchen supplies (coffee pots, mixers, canisters, pans, 
     aluminum foil, salt and pepper shakers), 
Serving supplies (dining trays, paper products, plastic  
     utensils, food containers), 
Large equipment (pastry cases, beverage dispensers,  
     salad bars), 
Other (aprons, tablecloths) 
Financial Fees (account maintenance fees, transaction charges,  
     currency exchange, electronic funds transfer fees), 
Checkbooks, 
Rebates (International Merchant Purchase  
     Authorization Card [IMPAC]/GPC rebates) 
Fire Protection Equipment (fire extinguishers, fire bottles, flame- 
     retardant hoods, smoke alarms, smoke detectors,  
     fire helmets firefighter equipment) 
Food (Not Catering) Food (break, cake popcorn), 
Drinks (sports beverages), 
Cooking ingredients (cooking oil, salt) 
Force Protection Barricades (concrete barriers, roadblock spikes, barbed 
     wire, Concertina wire, chain-link fencing, cones,  
     sandbags), 
Dog-related equipment (kennels, food, supplies), 
Surveillance (motion detector, walk-through metal  
     detectors, gas detectors, search pit equipment, 
     guard towers, metal detectors, floodlights), 
Miscellaneous (badge-activated locks, reflective belts,  
     reflective tape, bio detection/protection equipment), 
Police-related items (light bars, blood-alcohol detection 
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Category Examples 
Fuel and Fuel-related 
Items (Not Jet Fuel) 
Fuels (diesel, acetylene, propane), 
Fuel-storage equipment (fuel tanks, fuel bladders), 
Fuel-dispensing equipment 
Furniture Office (desks, chairs, couches, bookcases, filing 
     cabinets, workstations), 
Residential (beds, mattresses, dressers, footlockers), 
Other (stools, rugs, seats, cabinets, tables, folding 
     chairs, paintings) 




Grounds keeping services 
Heavy Equipment 
(Not Construction) 
Large vehicles (refrigerated trucks, fire trucks, flatbed  
     trucks, sewage-removal trucks, water trucks, fuel  
     trucks, freezer trucks), 
Cranes, forklifts, bucket loaders, aircraft stairways 
Interpreter Services Interpreters, linguists, and translator services 
Latrine Supplies Shower and bathroom supplies (soap, waterless hand  
     cleanser, paper towels), 
Chemicals for portable toilets 
Laundry Services Laundry and dry cleaning, 
Linen exchange, 
Alterations embroidery, 
Self-serve laundry centers 
Medical Services Doctor, dental, optometry, and chiropractic services, 
Hospital charges, 
Magnetic resonance imaging, X-ray consultation, 
Biohazard disposal 
Medical Supplies Medical supplies (bandages, thermometers, sterile  
     water, medication, insulin, vaccines, syringes), 
Medical equipment (X-ray equipment, dental  
     equipment, respirators, lab equipment, monitors), 










Items for personnel (T-shirts for various activities [not 
      MWR]), 
Non-mission (backpacks, gloves, knives, towels, duffel  
     bags, irons, duct tape, keys, bed linens, window  
     treatments, baby wipes, sunscreen), 
Non-potable water (bulk water, dry ice), 
Small containers (hard-sided cases), 
Small equipment (locks, coolers/ice chests, small  
     heaters, scales, batteries [not for cars], cigarette  
     butt cans, cameras, video recorders, ear protectors, 
     flashlights, irons, voltage converters/adapters,   
     absorbent mats, air filters), 
Other miscellaneous items (insect bait, weed killer, 
     mousetraps, flags, etiquette books, signs, anti- 
     fatigue mats, spill kits, lamps, mirrors [not specific to 
     other categories], filters [generic], wastepaper  
     baskets) 
Miscellaneous 
Equipment 
Small equipment (mortar mixer, wet and dry vacuums,  
     pumps, refrigeration units, air compressors,  
     blowers, hedge trimmers, Coleman products,  
     portable vacuums, fans, plasma monitors [not TVs]),
Large containers (shipping containers, tanks, food and  
     trash containers, steel drums, intermodal  
     containers), 
Food/water screening (water-detection equipment,  
     salmonella screening kits), 
Hard-to-categorize items (cash counters, bullhorns,  
     megaphones, hand-washing stations, photo lab  
     accessories, turbid meters, pallets, trolley jacks,  
     locksmith equipment, adapters [not specific to other  









Miscellaneous (vehicle registration and licensing, photo 
     developing, locksmith services, Internet services,  
     picking up litter, photocopying, engraving, storage  
     handling, airfield sweeping, grease removal  
     [including cleaning grease traps]), 
Professional services (consultant services), 
Refuse and Garbage 
Services 
Refuse and garbage services,  




Item repair and maintenance (bicycles, vehicles, 
     generators), 
Calibration 
Tools Basic tools (hammers, screwdrivers, drills, drill bits, 
     clamps), 
Other tools (multipurpose tools, pressure sprayers), 
Welding and soldering equipment 
Transporting Cargo Express mail fees and other shipping charges, delivery 





Emergency leave,  
Taxi and limousine charges 
Uniforms Honor guard T-shirts, military boots, brassards 
Insignias and patches (enlisted rank, CENTAF patches,
     desert patches) 
Utility Services Electricity charges 
Vehicle Repair Parts Equipment (tow vehicle equipment, battery charges), 
Parts (tires, radiators, starters, belts, clutches, shock 
     absorbers, radiator hoses, wiper blades, oil filters,  
     pumps, switches), 









Passenger vehicles (autos, buses, sedans, light trucks, 
     sport-utility vehicles), 
Other small vehicles (pickup trucks, all-terrain vehicles, 
     John Deere Gator utility vehicles) 
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